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ABSTRACT
During the past decade the People's Republic of China has enacted important
social and economic reforms in an attempt to catch up with current Western
technology. These reforms have sparked tremendous interest in the international
business community. Several multi-national corporations, interested in low labor
costs and large market potential, are either doing business or have
representatives in China negotiating for future operations.
This flurry of activity occurred with such speed that the available facilities in China
proved insufficient in fulfilling the needs of business representatives, leaving
them no alternatives but to live and work out of hotel rooms. Thus the premise is
that there exists a need for real estate development which suits the needs of
these representatives.
This paper evaluates the feasibility and market potential of a project designed to
fill these needs. The analysis proceeds along three lines evaluating the political,
economic, and legal environment; the industry structure and process; and the
quantification of market demand and supply. The information is then synthesized
into conclusions about each of the three areas and the overall market potential.
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Thesis Advisor (Civil Engineering): Fred Moavenzadeh
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INTRODUCTION
During the past decade the People's Republic of China has made important
social and economic reforms in an attempt to catch up with current Western
technology. These reforms have sparked tremendous interest in the international
business community. Several multi-national corporations, interested in low labor
costs and large market potential, are either already doing business in China or
have representatives in China negotiating for future operations.
This flurry of interest and activity caught China without sufficient adequate
facilities to deal with the needs of these business representatives. There is a
severe lack of suitable office space and residences available to them,
representatives must live and work out of hotel rooms. This is not just an
uncomfortable situation but it is a difficult and inefficient way to attempt to do
business.
Thus there is a need for development which suits the needs of these
representatives. This thesis looks into the feasibility of developing a mixed-use
complex which would provide a complete living and working environment. The
complex would include office space, residential units, recreation facilities, and a
few small shops and restaurants.
To support the office occupants the management of the complex would
provide centralized services such as a secretarial staff, copying and computer
facilities, and telecommunications facilities. The plan would be to lease the office
space and residential units to companies which desire to provide a more efficient
working atmosphere for their representatives in China.
The People's Republic of China was established with the defeat of the
Kuomintang by the communisists in 1949. Since that time the evolution of the
PRC has been based on the philosphies of socialism. From it's starting point in
Marxist/Leninist theory the PRC moved in its own unique direction under the
leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Following a philosophy of self-reliance, China
enacted an import substitution industrialization policy and thus remained an
enigma to much of the world. After 1976, with the death of Mao and the fall of the
"Gang of Four" and the rise of the "pragmatists" and Deng Xiaoping, China
changed many of its own policies and enacted many reforms designed to bring
the country to the technological level of the Western world.
Understanding the context within which these reforms takes place is an
important part in understanding the reasons for and the objectives of these
reforms. Chapter one takes a brief look at the background of the country from
political, economic, and legal perspectives in an attempt to understand the
cultural basis behind the reforms. This will act as a guide to help predict future
directions and potential.
Coming down in scale from the national level, Chapter two focusses on the
real estate development industry specifically. Since the history of China is so
unique, it is natural that the industry has evolved differently over time than in the
Western world. A simplified structure of development in the United States is
utilized as a backdrop to look into the idosyncracies of doing development work
in the PRC. Once again the view is from both pre-reform and post-reform
perspectives. The information touches on the issues of land ownership, financing,
design, and construction in an attempt to define the key success factor for
completing a successful real estate development project in the PRC.
Before the expense of a design and construction of a building is undertaken, it
is prudent to make sure that there is indeed demand for such a project. Chapter
three begins with a brief description of the nature of the problem which business
executives currently face, moving into quantifying the potential demand. Since
foreign invested real estate projects in China have become so popular recently
there is significant competition among developers. A look at projected supply may
give indications of potential overbuilding. Finally, there is a customer profile to
provide definition of characteristics of potential buyers and direction for essential
project attributes.
Chapter four is the analysis and conclusions. It synthesizes the earlier
information into conclusions about market potential, industry attractiveness and
key success factors, and future country developments. Chapters five presents
cities for possible development and points out what to look for in the future in both
the industry and in the political scene. Chapter six assumes that a development
project is being undertaken and outlines the potential strategies which might be
used in presenting the project to the various players.
Due to the limited amount of information on the topic and the extremely rapid
pace of change within the country, several means of data collection were used in
an attempt to gain the most up to date information available. In addition to a
literature search, much of the information was also collected by the author
through a mail survey and personal interviews.
CHAPTER ONE: THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
1.1 POLITICS
1.1.1 THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the dominant organization within
China. The formal organization of the CCP is layed out in the party constitution.
Party constitutions are adopted at meetings of the National Party Congress
(NPC). These meetings are supposed to occur every five years, according to the
party constitution, but historically party congresses have been very irregular.
Party congresses nominally elect the presidium, which in turn elects a standing
committee (SC). In theory, the congress also elects the membership for the
Central Committee (CC), the Commission for Discipline Inspection, and the
Advisory Committee. In reality, the nominations for these offices are controlled by
the standing committee and the congress merely ratifies the decisions that the SC
has already made.
The CC is the most important body within the party. It meets at least once
every year and acts for the Congress, when it is not in session. The CC elects the
Secretariat, the Military Commision, the Politburo and its Standing Committee,
and the General Secretary of the party who presides over the CC, the Politburo,
and the SC.
The Politburo and the SC are the highest decision making bodies within the
party and within the country, formulating and enacting all state policies. The
Secretariat works under the direction of the Politburo and the SC and handles the
administrative work of the party leadership through several departments. It is
through this structure that the Politburo controls the day to day activities
throughout the party.
The structure throughout the lower levels of the party is virtually identical to
that at the center. There are various levels of party congresses which elect
corresponding area committees, advisory commissions, and commisions for
discipline. All of these groups while theoretically independent are naturally
responsible to the upper level commissions and their actions are always subject
to approval from a higher authority. (Exhibit 1)
1.1.2 STATE STRUCTURE
The heart of the state structure in the PRC is the people's congress system.
People's Congresses are representative assemblies which meet once a year.
There are 4 levels of congresses ranging from the National to the Township level.
Representatives are elected to the Township People's Congresses by the voters,
citizens 18 and over, and election to the higher levels is done by the subordinate
congress.
According to the state constitution, the congresses are "the highest organs of
state power." 1 At the top of the hierarchy is the National People's Congress
(NPC). The NPC discusses and approves work reports and the state plan,
legislative drafts, and elects major officials of the government. (State Council,
Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuraturate, Central Military
Commision) It also oversees 6 permanent committees: minorities, law, finance,
foreign affairs, overseas Chinese, and one for education, science, culture, and
health. The NPC also has a SC that meets once every two months which
exercises the formal powers of legislation and oversight.
The State Council is the primary administrative organ of the government. It
usually meets once a month and has a SC which meets twice weekly. It issues
decisions, orders, and administrative regulations and can submit legislative
proposals to the NPC. It is the functional center of state power.
The Central Military Commission is charged with the direction of China's
armed forces. The chairman for this commission is elected and he nominates the
remaining membership for approval by the NPC. This group is the state's
functional equivalent to the Party's Military Commission and while the two are
charged with similar functions overlap is avoided by having the same individuals
serve as the heads of both groups.
The PRC legal structure is based on the Russian model. The system consists
of general courts and procuratorates, as well as several special courts which exist
at all administrative levels. The Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's
Procuratorate are responsible to the NPC and its SC. This relationship is
repeated at all administrative levels. Procurators are supervisory, investigative,
and prosecutory officials who are involved in the investigation of individual cases
and also in the supervision of the legality of government work and the proper
operation of the court system. (Exhibit 2)
1.1.3 INTERACTION
The structure of the state system and the election process appear, at first
glance, to be quite representative. In fact, the major principle embodied in PRC
political institutions is that of "Democratic Centralism. "2 The question is how
democratic is the system, really?
Comparing the organizational charts of the CCP and the PRC state structure,
one notices that party organization parallels state organization at every level. 3
This is not merely coincidence. This similarity of structure was designed by the
party and permits them to monitor and guide the work of state organs through
party members in them.
It should be noted that "the dictatorship of the proletariat in communist China,
called the "people's democratic leadership," is considered by the CCP to be truly
democratic, since it is a dictatorship of the vast majority of the people, over a tiny
minority of reactionaries."4 The party sees itself as a leadership organ, deciding
policies to be implemented by the state structure and supervising the execution of
these policies.
Although the NPCs in both the party and state constitutions are supposed to
be the highest organs of power, they really have very little authority. The
congresses meet infrequently, therefore the power is really in the hands of the
party committees. The Politburo and its SC form the apex of the party pyramid
and are the key decision-making organs for all major policies. The role of the CC
is primarily to ratify the decisions made by the Politburo and its SC. State
institutions, such as the NPC, exist simply to give an aura of legitimacy to policies
predetermined by the party.
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The CCP maintains its leadership role through its control of the state electoral
process which is certainly not what Westerners would consider a democratic
process. Although congress and committee members are voted on, they are
subject to approval by the next ranking level of government. The higher the level
of government the more interest the party takes in the nominees. The CC is
responsible for convening sessions of the party congress. The committee
predetermines the agenda and preselects the nominees for specific positions. It
was not until 1979 that the state installed an election system with more
candidates than positions to be filled, and this was only implemented at the
county level. In practice, this makes the party-state system much more centralist
than democratic.
1.1.4 INTEREST GROUPS
In spite of all these links the Chinese political system is not entirely unified.
Within this centralist framework there are still various interest groups which do not
always share the same views as the central leadership. The alliances among
these groups is forever in a state of flux and it is this dynamic group interaction
which is responsible for the dramatic policy shifts which occur in the PRC. David
Goodman has edited a series of essays which define seven different interest
groups.5 These groups either have been, are, or have the potential to be
influential in determining public policy.
1.1.4.1 Economists
The economists have experienced renewed influence since the fall of the
"Gang of Four" in 1976. However, their position in the overall power structure is
still tenuous. As a group the economists lack cohesiveness. Although a
homogeneous group in terms of socio-demographic background, the members
have very different views about future development. These differences divide
them along three approaches to development strategy: The new mobilization
N- approach, the institutional approach, and the liberal approach.6 Due to this lack
of unity and because their role is not institutionalized within the system, the
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economists must still rely on other groups who share their views of economic
development to have any influence over the policy decisions of the leadership.
1.1.4.4 Teachers
Teachers, like economists, have benefitted greatly from the reform movement
of the late 70's and 80's. Although divided to a certain extent along primary,
secondary, and tertiary levels of education, the common bond still remains strong
enough to make them an important influential force. Teachers are not as
dependent on other groups as are the economists because they have an "implicit
power which accrues to them from their distinct occupational role."7 They have
used this to their advantage and have faired well during the past decade because
of this role as transmitters of knowledge and expertise which is crucial to the
success of the modernizations.
1.1.4.7 Intellectuals
Intellectuals have been important because of their traditional leadership status
but their involvement in policy formulation is in no way institutionalized. The role
of intellectuals may be characterized by a cyclical process. To begin,
disagreements in the political leadership of the Party or state develop. When
these disagreements cannot be settled within the higher leadership circles,
discussion and debate devolve upon a wider group and certain intellectuals are
mobilized. Eventually there is an emergence of a new consensus in the
leadership and debate is curtailed. At this point the intellectuals are no longer
needed and are once again relegated to their previous position. Without
structural changes they will still be subject to the vagaries of the past.
1.1.4.3 Military
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has played a significant role in the history
of the PRC. They have traditionally been utilized by the Party to maintain control
during periods of domestic unrest and to mobilize the masses for implementation
of central directives. However, it is difficult to identify a unified PLA position within
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the PRC political environment. There are numerous factional splits within the
leadership. Changes in relations with the outside world have meant alterations in
the balance of military and civil power. Lack of developed expertise has meant
that the PLA has developed few clearly defineable interests. Since the PLA was
organized for guaranteeing security it must respond to unstable domestic polititcs
which causes the armed forces to enter into different relationships with civil
authorities.
1.1.4.2 Provincial Party First Secretaries
The first party secretary of the provincial committee of the CCP is the ranking
cadre in each province and has become an increasingly important figure in
national politics. The provincial party first secretary can best be defined as a
"political middleman". 8 This is characterized by the opposing views of his role as:
1) an agent of central control in the province, directed by the Politburo in Beijing;
2) the formal leader of the province and acknowledged representative to the
center and other provinces. This duality highlights the first secretary as both a
national and provincial leader, and as a man who must satisfy two constituencies.
The importance of the position can be evidenced in many ways. The secretary
is the link in the hierarchy between policy formulation and policy implementation.
Therefore, the center takes great interest in the position and appoints the
secretaries, who take the policies conceived and passed at the national level and
implement them at the provincial level. Thus a secretary is dependent on the
center for his future career.
The position of provincial party first secretary is also viewed as an important
step on the way to Politburo membership. Therefore, when the factional powers
within the CCP realign at the national level the jobs of many of the secretaries
become uncertain. This was witnessed during the Cultural Revolution when only
two of the first secretaries. retained their positions.9
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1.1.4.6 Workers
Since the arrest of the "Gang of Four", the Chinese leadership has stressed
the need for democracy and legality as the foundation stones for reviving
Chinese society and bringing about the goal of the four modernizations. There
are two factors which give a social, or occupational group greater influence. The
degree of organization and the value of the group to the state. Workers fare well
in both these areas. Although small relative to the total population, the total
quantity of workers is numerically large. They are highly concentrated and tightly
organized at the national and work-place levels. Workers are the "main force in
carrying out the Four Modernizations" and therefore are also crucial to the
functioning of the economy.
1.1.4.5 Peasants
The final group which is of particular interest is, of course, the Chinese
peasants. While theoretically the peasants should be the most important group in
any socialist society, in China they have very limited power. Their interests are
supposedly transmitted to the political leadership through several formal
channels.
1) Numerous institutions are supposed to act in the interests of the people.
However, the officials in control of these institutions often have their own
agendas which revolve more around personal satisfaction than group needs.
2) Mass meetings, at which peasants are asked to make decisions which are not
already predetermined. In reality, these meetings are infrequent and generally
are only called when the leadership needs to mobilize the masses to
accomplish a particular task.
3) Elections for local people's congresses which are held once every two years.
Unfortunately, these elections have not been regularly held and until recently
were informal and always had the same number of candidates as positions to
be filled.
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4) Mass organizations made up of poor and lower-middle class peasants, which
are supposed to provide a forum for interest articulation. While there have
been attempts to revive them, very few of these organizations actually exist.
5) Elite representation
6) Letters to newspapers and radio stations, petitions to authorities, and big
character posters. While supposedly free from intervention the government
still monitors and censors the media and has been known to change policies
limiting or eliminating character posters if "unhealthy" activities develop.
Due to the relative ineffectiveness of these formal channels, informal and
illegal methods of influencing decision-makers have developed.
1) Personal relations networks based on strong ties of lineage and village lay the
groundwork for a high degree of favoritism.
2) Bribery of local officials is commonly used as a means of getting appointed to
the best jobs or of gaining access to controlled quantities of scarce goods and
resources.
3) Speculation and black market sales of controlled commodities to capitalize on
price restraints and product rationing.
4) Under-reporting of output to reduce the amount of products sold to the
government at below market prices.
5) Withholding goods and services to protest prices.
6) Demonstations such as the student marches of last year to protest the pace of
reforms.10
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These methods have still given the peasants little influence over the political
leadership, to date, and certainly have not provided the amount of representation
which would be expected in a socialist state.
1.1.5 FACTIONS
At the present time, these various groups have united to form two competing
factions. The unifications are centered around competing views on the proper
methods for economic reform. The "reformists" led by Deng Xiaoping are a
combination of "pragmatists" and "liberals". They are urging for sweeping
economic reforms in all sectors of the economy. They have been the architects for
the "responsibility system" in the agricultural sector and the move to greater
enterprise autonomy in the industrial sector. They believe in a balanced growth
pattern through the simultaneous stimulation of investment and consumption and
have pushed for the greater use of more market economy methodologies to
achieve the "four modernizations."
The "conservatives", while still agreeing about the need for economic reforms,
are still deeply tied to Maoist philosophies. They believe in the restriction of
current consumption so that the maximum level of resources can be used for
investment. Also in line with Maoist tradition, they are still very cautious about the
use of free markets because of the close association of market economies with
capitalism and the belief that the introduction of free market mechanisms
contradicts fundamental socialist philosophies.
1.1.6 REFORMS
These two factions are also the combatants in the debates over political
reforms. Since reforms of the political system are more closely related to the
future of the Party, the battles over political restructuring have been perhaps the
most intense of any. They have also resulted in the fewest number of reforms.
The reformists have been pushing for the need for political reforms in close
conjunction with economic reforms. Their belief is that the biggest problems for
the economic reforms come from a bureaucratic structure that is ill-suited to
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carrying them out. In line with this thinking the reformists have been striving to
achieve two objectives. First, they believe that there should be more popular
representation in the election system. Second, they have been attempting to
lessen the direct ties between the Party and the state by trying to prevent any
individual from holding top positions in both structures.
The conservatives, in general, have been unwilling to bend on either issue
because of there concerns over anything which they feel encroaches on the
powers of the Party and State. Therefore, the only political reforms which have
taken place to date have been at the county level. They have included direct
election to the people's congress and the inclusion of more candidates on the
ballot than spaces to be filled.
Although there have been a minimum of political reforms there have been
administrative reforms which may point the direction of things to come.
Enterprises have been given more autonomy in managing their own operations
by releasing managers from direct control of the central planning authority. New
laws have also been passed which prevent interference by local government
officials. These changes are leading the way to a seperation of industry from state
control and may signal even greater changes which are yet to come.
1.2 ECONOMY
1.2.1 STRUCTURE
The PRC in principle has traditionally had a centrally planned economy. In a
command economy all flows are controlled by the central planning authority.
(cpa) The planning authority controls all physical resources including land,
buildings, machinery, and other capital goods. (Exhibit 3) They also make all
decisions concerning utilization of inputs, production of outputs, quantities of
consumption, distribution of income, and investment in additional capital
construction. In doing this the authority concerns itself with maintaining three
equilibriums;
17
1. The value of consumer goods must equal the value of goods desired by
consumers.
2. The books for all enterprises under its control must balance.
3. It must balance the national budget or find ways to finance its deficit.11
Countries with command economies attempt to maintain these balances with
state planning and through the enforcement of an elaborate set of controls. The
planing process for achieving the balance of inputs and goods has several steps.
First, the authority sets production targets or quotas based on what they want
produced (rather than realistic production projections.) The cpa then obtains
projections and requests for inputs from the various enterprises. The quantities of
inputs requested are then compared with the amounts to be produced. Based on
the needs to balance this flow of materials, the cpa then tells some enterprises to
reduce their input requirements (often without reducing their quota.) In this way
the cpa balances the flows of materials throughout the country.
The cpa also evaluates capital investment needs and balances the flow of
money. It achieves this by setting prices for all inputs and outputs including the
wage rates of workers. This gives the authority the power to determine the profits
and losses for all enterprises. It gives the cpa the ability to implicitly distribute
funds to enterprises for capital expansion. It also allows them control over the
distribution of income and thus provides them with another means of limiting
current consumption in addition to the rationing of goods.
1.2.2 PROBLEMS
It should be apparent from this description that everything to do with the
economy goes through the planning authority or a ministry or agency working for
the cpa. Therefore, the success of the economy rests solely on the planning
authority's ability to correctly calculate flows and impose its decisions. This
naturally requires a large staff which collects and analyzes data from the
enterprises, then makes decisions and supervises their fulfillment.
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Obviously, in an organization of this size and with such a broad mandate there
are bound to be problems. Collecting all the data necessary to make not just
macro but also micro-economic decisions is a virtually impossible task. Even if
the data could be collected, the size and scope of planning the economy for an
entire country is a formidable job. These problems have led to some very
unrealistic plans in the past. Ensuring adherence to the plan is not simple either.
The supervising administrative staff must see to it that plans are carried out down
to the smallest economic units. This task is difficult enough under the best of
circumstances but is complicated by the fact that the administrative units of each
province have their own economic and political objectives which do not
necessarily match that of the cpa.
In addition to the planning and administrative problems, there are also
problems inherent within command economies which further aggrevate the
problems. First of all, because administrative control plays such a large role in the
economy, political changes have a much greater impact than they would in a
market economy because of the volatility in policy changes which often
accompany changes in leadership. Labor difficulties are also a source of
numerous problems. In terms of job assignments there is often a mismatch
between qualified workers and jobs, because desirable jobs are often assigned
based on favors. This is due in great part to the elevation of these positions
because of the lack of material incentives and the setting of wages.
All of this leads to a high level of inefficiency. Since jobs are guaranteed and
wages are set independent of productivity, it is very difficult to motivate workers. It
is also hard to motivate managers to improve efficiency because their goals are to
meet their assigned production quota and not to maximize profits. This in turn
leads to a host of other problems. Since managers are penalized if production
targets are not met, input estimates tend to be high and excessive input
inventories become a problem. There is no formal mechanism for redistributing
these inventories and they either remain unutilized or find their way to the black
market. Since not only raw materials inputs but also spare parts for machinery are
allotted by the authority, many production enterprises machine their own parts to
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avoid the lengthy delays that accompany formal requests. This leads to an
enormous amount of duplication within the system.
1.1.3 REFORMS
The underutilization and inefficiency which proliferated during the 1960's and
70's has given way to the economic reform movement of the 80's. The goal of the
economic reforms is to achieve the "four modernizations" of agriculture, industry,
national defense, and science and technology. These are ambitious objectives
aimed at allowing China to catch up with the Western world by the year 2000.
With these goals in mind, the third plenary session of China's 11th party congress
adopted a policy of "readjustment, restructuring, consolidation, and improvement"
which has proved to be highly successful for the past decade.
1.1.3.1 Domestic
The first step, was to increase productivity in the agricultural sector. There
were two reasons for this. First of all, in 1978, the "iron rice bowl" was not living up
to its name and 150 million people starving. 12 Second, there was also a lack of
resources needed for industrial production activities. This meant that precious
foreign exchange was being consumed for importing grain and raw materials
rather than technology. This would have to change if the modernizations were to
succeed. Therefore, a series of agricultural reforms were adopted which have
come to be known as the "responsibility system."
To begin with, land ownership was changed. During the ?O's, all of China's
farmland was organised into communes which were at that time considered the
most important economic unit. The land was farmed collectively, with local
officials dictating to farmers what they should grow, when and where. In 1978,
under the Deng led reforms, these commune officials were stripped of their
authority. The land was confiscated and redistributed to families, and the
household became the basic economic unit. Along with the redistribution came a
relaxing of restrictions as well. Farmers were now given 15 year leases on the
land and the freedom to grow what they liked. The means of determining the
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amount of crops sold to the government was altered from a percentage of harvest
to a fixed contracted amount. This meant that there was now incentive for the
farmers to produce more because now they could do what they wished with the
excess above quota. The government also increased the official prices of crops.
In other words, the government agreed to pay more for the produce which it
purchased. All of these moves gave the farmers more direct responsibilities over
their land and direct rewards from their own efforts. The success of the
"responsibility system" is evident from the growth in the agricultural sector.
(Exhibit4)
With reform in the agricultural sector well underway, sights turned towards
industry. In December 1984, the Party congress instituted a series of new policies
aimed at copying the success of the agricultural reforms in the industrial sector.
Different forms of ownership have begun to be used and permitted within the
industrial sector. Many inefficient state run factories have been sold off to groups
of employees and are now run as collectives. Although not officially recognized,
privatization and entrepreneurship have also begun to creep into the system. So
far, this activity has been primarily in the service sector but there have been some
ventures into the industrial sector as well. In addition to these new forms of
ownership, stock and bond distribution and ownership has been experimented
with since 1986.13 All of these new ownership forms have been used to
supplement and replace the strictly state controlled system.
Naturally, with the development of more economic units operating outside of
the state controlling mechanisms there was a need for administrative reforms.
The major move was to make enterprises more autonomous. In general, factory
managers are now permitted to sign contracts with suppliers of their choice and to
sell their products to whomever they chose. Since this reduced the ability of the
system to monitor and control capital flows, restrictions were relaxed and a tax
system was also enacted which taxed the profits of a company at a given rate.
This new tax system left distribution of the profits after taxes to the discretion of the
enterprise managers.
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If the managers were to be given funds, then they needed to have means to
use them. This translated into a relaxation of the "iron rice bowl" labor principles.
The traditional nine wage grade principles have given way to fluctuating wages
and bonuses based upon company performance, while the policy of guaranteed
permanent employment has undergone some dramatic changes. Workers are no
longer assigned to jobs for life but can be hired and fired by enterprises in
keeping with a new system of contracting for labor. Managers have also been
given additional freedoms in determining the amount of resources to be used for
capital construction.
With the introduction of all these new freedoms and the direct interaction
between suppliers and producers, it became necessary to introduce a series of
price reforms. Prices in China have been fixed by the government at artificially
low levels for a number of years. If direct interaction between economic units was
to be allowed, then the prices of goods must reflect the scarcity of resources
available in the country. Therefore, prices of some goods have been allowed to
rise introducing a small degree of market pricing mechanisms into the system.
However, this does not apply to all goods and an artificial cap still exists on the
prices for most goods. This has had a limiting effect on the effectiveness of the
reforms put into place to date but indicates the trend in which reforms are headed.
1.1.3.2 Foreign Investment Community
The political leadership has not only been concerned with domestic reforms
but has also been very interested in encouraging foreign involvement in the
economy. The Chinese know that foreign investment and technology transfer are
two essential elements for success of the "four modernizations." Therefore, they
have undertaken a series of actions designed to attract Western companies.
The establishment of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in 1980 was the
first step to attract foreign investment. The political leadership recognized not only
the need for foreign investment to help in the modernizations, but also realized
the importance of seperation between the domestic centralist system and the
international market economy. Naturally the leadership did not want to risk losing
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control over the pace of the reforms, more importantly however, they realized that
their system lacked the sophistication to coexist with a market economy.
Therefore the SEZs were created.
The SEZs were envisioned as autonomous economic regions. They were
given two mandates. One, to actively pursue and attract foreign investment and
technology to China. Two, to act as beachheads for the economic modernizations
which were to spread throughout the country. To accomplish this the SEZs have
been allowed broad range of freedom. They do all the planning for activities
within their designated boundries. They are permitted to negotiate directly with
foreign companies and are given priority for uses of foreign exchange. They are
also allowed to develop their own bodies of economic law.
Of course, the leadership was not going to allow the SEZs to develop without
maintaining a certain amount of control so the joint venture regulations were
enacted. With the SEZs established to attract foreign investment, the JV
regulations were established to ensure technology transfer. The regulations
established ownership at 51% domestic and 49% foreign. They also defined the
management structure of the venture, the responsibilities of the two partners, and
the duration of the venture. While these regulations may have appeared good to
the Chinese, they encountered problems within the international business
community.
Foreign companies found out very quickly that once they had made their
investment they had little control over the venture. The local content laws forced
domestic sourcing which was governed by the cpa and problems with the central
allocation system often caused scheduling and cost overruns. In addition to these
limitations the government control of labor further exacerbated the problem. The
Chinese Labor Bureau commonly assigned workers to jobs who had little or no
experience at the task. Once the worker had developed the skills he would often
be pulled from the venture and placed in a state run enterprise while another
untrained worker was substituted in his place. Companies also found that the
limitations on wages and incentives were too strict and provided them with no
means of encouraging productivity increases.
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Manufacturers also found that there were frequently disagreements over the
expectations of the venture and the firms contribution. A common problem which
many companies faced was disagreement over what market the venture was
making products for. Foreign companies frequently opened operations in China
hoping to sell to the Chinese market. The Chinese planned on exporting to the
rest of the world and expected the firm to supply the world class technology to
produce the products. These problems often led to compromise agreements
which neither party was really happy with.
Firms experienced major problems due to forex shortages. Even firms which
had government approval for foreign sourcing of materials often could not get the
foreign exchange from the government. Therefore, if they wanted the materials
they had to foot the bill out of there own pocket. This might have been allright if
they would have been reimbursed but once again forex shortages became a
problem. Companies often experienced problems in getting foreign exchange not
only for their material contributions but for profits as well. They often faced
situations in which the government would try to pay in goods rather than money.
As if these problems weren't bad enough, because of the non-existence of
any laws, companies found that their patents, trademarks, and trade secrets were
given no protection. Therefore, not only their Chinese partner but any competitors
which might happen to have operations in China would have unlimited access
and use of a firms technology. This meant that going into China became an
extremely high-risk endeavor for any company.
Therefore, after an initial period of enthusiasm in 1980-81 foreign investment
activity in China slowed considerably. This served as a red flag to the Chinese
and they have moved to correct these problems.
New regulations have been passed which outline four different types of
foreign investment ventures permitted in China, including wholly-foreign owned
subsidiaries under certain circumstances. Along with this have come some
changes in the rules governing ownership of assets as well. An important
development in the real estate area was the availability of land in Shanghai to
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foreign developers on a 50-year lease basis, which in essence amounts to
foreign ownership of land in China, something which has not existed since 1949.
Several steps have been taken to increase the sophistication of financial
services. The development of a nationwide banking system has begun. These
banks are now granting loans and charging interest. They recently also began to
experiment with a mortgage system. The government has also allowed
experimenting with new financial instruments such as stocks and bonds in both
the foreign and domestic communities. They have also formalized forex
regulations by having banks issue letters of credit for foreign invested ventures.
There have been several changes in the management arena as well. The
regulations for structuring the top management of a venture have been relaxed so
that foreign firms now have more input power in the decision-making process. In
the sourcing of materials, ventures are now allowed to sign contracts directly with
the domestic suppliers and more external sourcing is being permitted.
Companies have been given the right to hire and fire workers and the
government is now experimenting with company-employee labor contracts. The
grade structure for wages has been relaxed allowing for differential wages and
material incentives. These reforms have been encouraging to foreign investors.
1.3 LAW
Misunderstandings are an inherent part of cross-cultural communications.
Ideas are often difficult, if not impossible, to transfer because of different modes of
thought that have developed over time. Thus a "taking culture" will select traits of
a "giving culture" and reinterpret what it borrows into a context that it
understands. 14 Therefore, cultural borrowing does not necessarily assure cultural
understanding. These problems of translation and interpretation are, perhaps,
nowhere as critical as in the realm of law for it is in the field of law that Western
governments and businesses appear least likely to compromise and to accept
uncertainty.
For centuries, Western countries have held the belief that their own values are
the correct values. Therefore, because of a desire to create one world order,
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these countries have tried to impose their beliefs and organizational structures
upon other countries and cultures, often running into problems because of a lack
of intercultural understanding. This tradition of misunderstanding is typical in the
relationship between China and the West. To overcome the problem, we must
compare and understand the differences in thought between the two cultures.
1.3.1 WESTERN LAW
Western society is very dynamic and individualistic. Within this environment
law has been consistently trusted "as the main carrier of shared values, the most
effective agent of social control, and the only reliable principle capable of
moderating and reducing the reign of passion, arbitrariness, and caprice in
human life."s15 Law is seen as essential for providing order among the general
public and structure for government.
The fundamental legal concept or entity in Western law is the individual. In
western cultures the individual is expected to function not only as a member of
society but also as an autonomous human being and a high value is placed on
originality and creativity. The laws are designed to protect the rights of individuals
to pursue their own interests while preventing them from infringing upon the rights
of others.
This ideology has been transferred into currently prevailing international law
which recognizes the rights of sovereign states and is designed to maintain order
and define remedies in the hopes that armed conflict will be avoided. It assumes
that peace and order are the preferred and if war should break out it establishes
rules which are to be followed.
1.3.2 CHINESE LAW
The structure of Chinese societal thought is very unique. It can be
differentiated from that of Western societies in three primary ways. First, individual
rights are inconceivable in Chinese society. Second, the Chinese notion of order
excludes that of law. Third, the concepts of state and nation are unknown in
traditional Chinese thought. 16
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In Asian tradition, the main structuring principle is based on the theory of unity.
The group is the primary focus of concern and individualism is viewed as
subordinate to authority. "This ideology has been administered effectively not
through impersonal laws, legislatures, federal devices, and judicial systems but
through the mechanisms of family ethics, personalism, and social ritual, on the
one hand, and of an elaborate administrative bureaucracy on the other." 17
The guiding principle has been the Confucian Li/Fa system. It applies to
everyone and dictates carefully graded social relationships. An individuals Li
"regulated his behavior, his name, his decorations, the color of his dress, the kind
of carriage he was allowed to ride in, and the type of material his mattress could
be made of."18 Fa was a system of punishment which was enforced upon
anyone who could not maintain li. The head of the household, or the individual
with the highest li, was the "judge" in determining violations of Ii. The purpose of
these decisions was not to determine right and wrong, but merely to maintain
harmony and the status quo. Hence, the person with the lower Ii was always
"wrong" and would be severely punished. Punishment was usually of a physical
nature and was very harsh. The philosophy being that the punishment should be
harsh enough so that it would not be necessary to punish again.
The ideas of unity and order were not just limited to thoughts of domestic
harmony, but dominated the Chinese concept of world order as well. China, "the
Middle Kingdom," was seen as the center of the world and superior to all other
societies. The governance of China was believed to have been bestowed on the
emperor by Heavenly Mandate. A mandate which throughout Chinese history
was often accomplished by armed conflict. Neighboring societies were viewed
not as equal sovereign states but as inferior members of China's Confucian
family. In this international context Ii meant that every other society was
subordinate to the Chinese. The imposition of fa meant that "war was presented
consistently as a necessary chastisement of under developed, uncouth peoples,
or as punishment for states that were badly ruled." 19 In this context, Chinese
thought promoted the "sublimation of war as the dominant purpose of all political
life and the denegration of pesce as the source of the six maggots of the state."20
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They believed that the state existed for the sole aim of conquest and that it was a
misfortune for a prospering country not to be at war.
With the Confiucian system as a governing principle the need for civil laws
and courts was limited. Therefore, when the procurorate and court structures
were established they were not charged with handling civil law cases. Instead,
the were formed strictly to deal with problems of the state and the Party. The
procurorate was/is basically a watchdog agency with the responsibility of
investigating government officials to ensure that they carry out state policy. If the
procurorate finds grounds for prosecution the courts then try the case. These
courts are therefore unlike what Westerners are used to because they have
nothing to do with civil suits and only have jurisdiction over state and Party affairs.
1.3.3 REFORMS
1.3.3.1 Domestic
Being based in this tradition it becomes clear why the Chinese are having a
difficult time developing "laws." If the Chinese do not comprehend the notion of
individual rights then how do they understand "laws" and "contracts"? If they do
not believe in the rights of the "state " and the "nation" then how can they
understand the structure and rights of the corporation?
In spite of these basic hurdles, China has made tremendous strides. Spurred
by economic reform and realizing the need for a legal structure not only for
maintaining domestic order but also for attracting foreign investment, the Chinese
leadership has been very actively promoting a law writing campaign. The process
for development of these laws has included borrowing laws from the West and
tailoring them to China's needs and soliciting the aid of foreign lawyers in helping
to develop laws based upon the experiences within their own countries. So far
the results have been very encouraging with the development of over 300 laws of
which approxiamately 250 are in the domestic and foreign investment arenas. To
deal with disputes in these areas the Chinese have established an arbitration
agency to hear all cases. If this forum proves unsatisfactory, the Chinese have
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also established a new and seperate court structure to deal with cases in these
areas.
Two major developments for state enterprises are the State Industrial
Enterprise Rules, adopted in 1983, and the Bankruptcy Law, adopted in 1986.
The enterprise rules govern the link between enterprises and local state agencies
and government departments. Since this link is so critical in a planned economy,
Chinese leaders realized a need to establish legal relationships to replace
institutional ones as the reforms began to substitute indirect economic reforms for
direct administrative control. With this new freedom the development of contract
law has become very important as the number of relationships between
enterprises grows and the devlopment of laws to address these needs are being
very actively pursued.
The Bankruptcy Law was designed to discipline inefficient enterprises and is
the most controversial of all laws written to date. But perhaps more important than
the actual law itself is the direction that the resolution of the controversy about the
law suggests for future developments. The debate centered on the issue of
whether bankruptcy was even possible in a socialist state because of the
assumption of permanent employment.
1.3.3.2 Foreign Investment Community
Two parallel laws applying to the foreign investment sector, the Regulations of
the Guangdong SEZ (enacted January 1,1987) and the Foreign Companies
Bankruptcy Provisions of Shenzen Economic Zone (enacted December 7, 1986),
have also been implemented.
The Guangdong Regulations address establishment, operation, management,
liability, and liquidation. The Regulations identify four types of limited liability
companies including wholly foreign-owned enterprises, establish a minimum
amount of registered capital for a company to maintain, and set rules for
incorporation. They allow ventures to issue stocks and bonds and to pay
dividends. Unlike the previous joint venture rules, the new regulations allow the
foreign partner to appoint the chairman of the board if both partners agree, relax
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restrictions on foreign sourcing, and have more involvement in labor
management.
The Shenzen bankruptcy Provisions provide legal clarification of the
bankruptcy proceedings and division of assets upon liquidation. They discuss
both voluntary and compulsory dissolution and outline the legal liabilities of both
the Chinese and foreign venture directors.
In addition to these major "laws", the reforms have also encouraged
development of laws and regulations in several other areas. China has
developed rules for registering enterprises, invalidating contracts, establishing
trademarks, tax management, accounting practices, labor relations, and
advertising. They have also established an arbitration agency and a seperate
court system to handle disputes in these areas.
Although China has come a long way in a short time, there are still many
questions which must be resolved. Domestic enterprise autonomy and forms of
ownership continue to outpace legislation and their still are no regulations
outlining the responsibilities of collective enterprises. In foreign investment
ventures, the legal distinctions between a corporation and an enterprise are still
vague and the distinctions between public and private corporations are still
unclear. As China continues to develop new pieces of legislation to fill these
holes it will be important to monitor the changes and make sure that the
legislation is not just functional, but logically coherent and internally consistent
with the entire body of law.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE DEVELOPMENT INDUSTRY
2.1 REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
2.1.1 THE PRODUCT
The nature of the product of the development industry is quite unique. Their
are two primary characteristics which make buildings different then common
manufactured goods.
First, the product is not transportable. Buildings are not like goods which can
be manufactured in a plant and shipped all over the world. They are very location
specific. Soil conditions may dictate the type of structural system which has to be
used. Local design codes and regulations may determine size and shape. Site
access and supplier availability can determine the types of materials and
machinery to be used. Local worker skills may determine the construction
techniques and processes to be used. Climate can play a large part of
determining the building season and influencing the project schedule. The
consideration and resolution of all these variables link a building to a specific
location long before construction actually takes place.
Second, although in a microcosm sense buidings could be considered to be
very similar in terms of the tasks involved, each buiding is very unique. While the
method of putting in wires or pipes or drywall is basically the same from one
project to the next varying architectural designs means that each building is
different in terms of size, shape, materials and methods of construction. This
means that the skills and techniques needed to construct a building change from
o- project to project. It also means that the sequence of activities within the
construction process may change. This makes the management and scheduling
of each project unique to that project.
2.1.2 THE STRUCTURE
The most noticeable characteristic of the developement field is the
proliferation of firms that is continually occuring. This is true not only among
developers but also among architectural and engineering design firms as well as
construction firms. The proliferation of firms is prevalent in all these fields
because of the low barriers to entry which exist. A developer simply needs an
idea and minimal initial financial backing. An architect or engineer needs a
degree and a license but very minimal financing. Contractors simply need the
knowledge to bid jobs.
The nature of the product naturally effects the structure of the industry and the
unique nature of each project plus the large number of variables associated with
the successfully completing a project has lead to a high degree of specialization
and thus a lack of vertical intergration. A project will involve a developer,
financeer, architect, engineer, general contractor, and sub-contractors not to
metion the possible involvement of seperate project managers, leasing agents,
and property managers. Each of these participants has a unique and important
role in successfully carrying a project to fruition.
Each one of these disciplines is also characterized by a high degree of
fragmentation itself. In all of these disciplines a thorough knowledge of the local
environment and its peculiarities is a critical success factor. Therefore, there has
been limited horizontal integration as well. Instead there has been a proliferation
of small privately held firms, competing in highly localized markets.
2.1.3 THE PROCESS
In keeping with the specialization and the proliferation of firms, the actual
process of development is naturally very fragmented itself. Most participants are
involved in the project for a very short period of time relative to its entire duration.
The lack of vertical integration means that the value-added chain is much more
like seperate links than a chain. (Exhibit 5)
Although each building and project team may be quite unique, the
development process itself is fairly standard. The developer starts the process
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with the generation of an idea for a potential project. He then goes through an
analysis phase during which he evaluates the feasibility of the project and
produces a project proposal. Armed with this proposal the developer begins to
look for financing. The project will be evaluated by potential investors or lending
institutions, who may or may not agree with the developers conclusions and
provide the necessary capital.
Once financing is arranged an architect is selected and the design will
proceed in earnest. The architects and engineers will strive to turn the developers
vision into a realizable building. During this period time is spent giving
presentations and revising the design to obtain the necessary approvals.
Upon completion of design, the contract is sent out to bid and a general
contractor will be selected. He is responsible for the actual construction of the
project. The general contractor obtains the necessary materials and
sub-contractors for completing the work and coordinates their activities. Once the
building is completed it is ready for occupancy. The sales or leasing agent then
fills the space with tenants and the building is released to the property manager
for ongoing maintenance.
This is a highly simplified explanation of the product, structure, and process of
the real estate development industry. The unique nature of each project means
that many variations on the theme are developed to handle individual project
idiosyncracies. The preceeding description is intended to act as a framework
against which the Chinese industry can be compared and contrasted.
2.2 REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA
2.2.1 LAND OWNERSHIP
Land ownership by foreign nationals has not existed in China since 1949
when all property was nationalized. This naturally means that "ownership" of a
project is different in China than it would be in a country such as the US.
Developers in China do not own the land which they build on or the buildings
they construct. The typical "ownership" structure in China, is for the developer to
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negotiate the rights to build and maintain control of the assets of a project for a
duration specified in the agreement. At the end of the term of the contract, control
of all assets usually passes on to the Chinese joint-venture partner. These
contract terms vary from project to project with terms ranging from 8-25 years with
a mean length of 15.6 years.
2.2.2 FINANCING
The availability for domestic financing of projects being done in China is very
limited if not non-existent. First, the financial markets in China are currently under
development. They are relatively unsophisticated and nothing like those of
Western nations. In fact, until just recently no such thing as a mortgage even
existed. Therefore, it is easy to see how the lack of financial instruments severely
hampers the search for domestic financing. Second, even if the financial
institutions and instruments did exist getting funds would still be a problem. The
Chinese have experienced a severe shortage of foreign exchange during the
80's which has hampered their modernization objectives. Therefore, the
leadership is very interested in the uses of forex. They have targetted certain
industries which are to receive special consideration and real estate is not one of
them.
Therefore, due to the lack of capital availability within China developers must
look to outside sources to provide funds. The developer must still convince banks,
insurance companies, or other potential investment institutions to invest in their
China projects. For most projects, financing terms are similar to what they would
be in the US. In a growing number of instances, however, large amounts of
partnership equity are being included in the structure of several agreements.
Although investment in China is coming from many different places, HK still
leads the way in real estate development funds with 42.05%. Japan and the US
are second and third with 22.67% and 16.1% respectively. (Exhibit 6) It should be
noted however that much of the investment noted in the HK figures may include
subsidiaries of US, European, and Japanese MNCs or companies acting for
investors of other countries.
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Capital has been fairly available for development projects in China. The
reasons for this are twofold. First, hotels and apartments are foreign exchange
generating ventures, thus alleviating the problems of forex acquisition which
plague many manufacturing joint-ventures. Second, there has been an obvious
shortage of comfortable accomodations in most of China's cities. Therefore,
investors have not been concerned about high vacancy rates and overbuilding
believing that once completed the project would provide a guaranteed return. In
the final analysis, this means that the financing arrangements for most real estate
development projects in China are not much different than a typical US project.
2.2.3 DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
The areas of design and construction have undergone considerable change
during the past decade. The structure and the sophistication of the fields has
changed as has the involvement of foreign firms. These changes have not only
altered the type of involvement of foreign firms but have also changed the key
success factor for operating in the Chinese market.
2.2.3.1 Pre-Reform
In the pre-reform era of the PRC developers didn't really exist. Since all capital
assets were owned by the state and all construction was controlled by state
ministries the government was the only developer in the country. The Chinese
government also served as the only financeer. The government was not only the
developer of the project but also the buyer as well as the supplier of all inputs
such as labor, materials, and equipment as well. This structure meant that the
government had a great deal of power over every aspect of the building process.
The design and construction process for domestic buildings in China was
nothing like the process in Western countries. The coordination of trades was
minimal if not non-existent. Design and construction would progress one trade at
a time. The structure and enclosure was designed and built and then the
remainder of the trades did their work one at a time. Plumbing contractors came
in and made holes where necessary to complete their work and then patched
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them up and left. They would be followed by mechanical contractors who did the
same thing. This process continued until all of the work was completed. While this
alleviated problems of scheduling and coordination among various trades it took
its toll on the building. A good example is the Yanjing hotel which already looked
ten years old when it was completed.
Technology and product limitations also had a limiting effect on the design
capabilities of Chinese architects and engineers and the skills of construction
workers and contractors. Due to scarcity of new materials and advanced
technologies, the Chinese buiding industry was still very much rooted in masonry
construction techniques. Therefore, the abilities of Chinese designers to deal with
more advanced materials and construction techniques was severely hampered,
merely because of a lack of exposure. This had a corresponding effect in the
construction field. Since designers were not specifying new materials contractors
weren't using them. This meant that contractors and construction workers were
not well versed in the use of new materials and techniques either. Basically, no
one saw any incentive or need to advance beyond their present skill level and so
no progress was achieved.
Labor was traditionally a source of tremendous inefficiencies in the
construction industry just as it was in others. Due to the nature of the socialist
system with fixed wages and guaranteed employment, there were no incentives
for workers to be productive. The problems with productivity were further
aggravated by the fact that the Chinese Labor Bureau assigned workers to
projects and tasks and the firm had no say whatsoever in these appointments.
Therefore, laborers often ended up doing tasks for which they were unskilled or
unqualified.
Materials availability was also a major problem within the traditional structure.
Within the traditional command economy many materials were centrally
allocated. This method of sourcing often proved inadequate either in terms of
insufficient quantity or or unacceptable quality of materials. These problems often
translated into costly project delays over which the firm had no control.
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The design and construction process was not the only difference between
Chinese and Western buildings. The standards were also quite different. The
standards were far below what Western designers and builders would consider
as minimum. The experience of a US businessman is indicative of the
differences. The businessman was utilizing office space Beijing in a building
which had no heat (this in itself would not be allowed by US standards.) Winters
in Beijing can be very cold and so they plugged in three electric heaters in their
office. The extra load on the electric circuits blew the electricity for the entire
building. As it turned out circuit breakers were not required or standard in all
buildings. This simply illlstrates the types of differences which might be
encountered.
This is the environment in which foreign firms attempted to do business. Since
the government was the only source of business, companies were forced to deal
with the bureaucracy or ignore the market. The means of acquiring work was
through competitive bidding and foreign firms were supposed to supply
everything except the koolie labor. In this market low price and skillful project
management were the keys to success.
2.2.3.2 Post-Reform
In the post-reform era this structure has changed considerably. The
government is no longer the sole developer. The reforms have opened the way
for foreign developers, and several are currently doing projects in China. The
increase in the number of foreign firms with operations in China supplies the
market with several potential buyers and the relaxation of centralized economic
controls means that there are numerous suppliers for materials both domestically
and abroad.
The government is still a major player but in a much different way. They are
much less involved in the day to day specifics of each project but are still very
concerned with the overall development of the country. The method by which they
retain control is the joint-venture regulations. They monitor adherence to the
regulations and have final approval over all contracts. They can deny approval
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and frequently become involved in the contract negotiations themselves. This
set-up means that there is much less interference in the actual project itself but
much more attention is paid to the initial negotiations.
The reforms have also removed many of the problems and limitations that
companies faced. Now, foreign firms are officially allowed to hire and fire
employees and differentiation of wages and providing material incentives is
being permitted. These changes have encouraged a shift in the attitude of the
work force. Some firms have found the Chinese workers more consciencious and
eager to learn and productivity has been on the rise. The quality of work has also
improved dramatically over this period spurred by the increase in incentives and
by the advancements in technological capabilities.
As a means of addressing the problems of material acquisition and allocation
the official policy has been to move away from central allocation toward simply
requiring indigenous sourcing. The policy has permitted direct contact between
foreign contractors and domestic suppliers. This has led to the involvement of
contractors in shop inspections and in qualifying vendors and has translated into
an increase in the variety and an improvement in the quality of materials.
The recent construction boom has encouraged an even further relaxation of
domestic sourcing policiy. The boom has caused a shortage of domestically
i- available materials. With materials suppliers already operating at full capacity the
government is now allowing several firms to import large amounts of materials
from foreign suppliers.
Equipment sourcing has experienced a similar change in policy. Projects
often experienced delays due to problems with centrally allocating equipment.
Presently, equipment that is not available within the country is often being
shipped in. One stipulation that some firms are experiencing, however, is that the
equipment must be shipped out at the completion of the project.
The methods of acquiring business have also changed. Due to the increasing
amounts of foreign investment in real estate, an ever increasing amount of work is
being gained through developers. Since the Chinese are so eager for foreign
investment it is now quite common for developers/investors to specify their design
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and construction firm. This indicates a shift in the market which is opening new
opportunities for firms as well as a change in project relationships and dynamics.
Construction firms are now providing a piece of the puzzle which must fit into a
much larger proposal package.
Accompanying this change in industry structure has been a change in the
means of acquiring contracts. Because of the interest in technology transfer and
the joint-venture regulations, negotiation has to a large extent replaced bidding
and the negotiating in increasingly occurring along two fronts. Their are the
government sponsored capital construction projects, in which the negotiations
are similar to the ones described previously and projects undertaken by foreign
developers, in which the negotiations follow commom western practices.
In addition to a change in the means of acquiring contracts the type of services
provided has also changed. With the transfer of skills that has taken place the
foreign partners involvement has been reduced to basic engineering, off-shore
procurement, overall project management, and training of Chinese engineers.
The Chinese have even begun to enter into joint-ventures with firms for projects
in third countries. Although to date they have only been subcontracting labor, this
is indicative of the advances the construction industry in China has achieved.
2.4 NEGOTIATIONS
The most important characteristic of the development process in China today
is the amount and nature of negotiations which are involved. Success in initial
negotiations is often the key to a projects success and the negotiations are far
from what Westerners consider as typical.
Western negotiations are "results" oriented. Reaching a final contract which is
acceptable to both sides as quickly as possible is the objective. Once the contract
has been signed it is assumed that each partner will live and act within the spirit
of the contract. If either one doesn't then the courts have the authority to settle the
dispute.
Chinese negotiations are more "process" oriented. The Chinese are tough
negotiators and the duration of the negotiations can seem like an eternity.
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"Western businessmen often find contract negotiations in China to be a traumatic,
stressful endurance test. The Chinese see negotiations as a means of testing the
oppositions resolve." Therefore, the Chinese are probably encouraged by long,
trying negotiations.
In conjunction with the different philosophies about negotiations, the "rules" of
negotiations are also quite different. To begin with the schedule for negotiations
is not mutually agreed upon. From the moment of arrival in China the Chinese
control the schedule. While a foreign executive may be ready to start negotiating
right away it may take some time before negotiations actually begin. The Chinese
like to keep their adversaries off guard and may take you on a couple days of
sightseeing trips before getting down to business. This uncertainty of schedule is
a typical technique which the Chinese use to keep their opponents off-balance.
Once negotiations actually begin the process and forum for negotiating are
also unique. The Chinese continue to manipulate the schedule by having no
planned breaks and simply calling for one at a convenient moment. It is also not
uncommon for Western negotiators to be outnumbered as much as 10-1. One
reason for this is the large number of parties which must be involved from the
Chinese side. Negotiations include not only the joint-venture partner but
representatives from the appropriate ministry(ies) as well as the final end user.
This of course complicates the negotiations because of the multiplicity of
agendas. A second, and probably more important, reason for the large number of
"observers" is for reporting what is taking place up the appropriate channels. This
aspect has direct correlation to the duration of negotiations because it is
important for the Chinese to show their superiors that they are shrewd negotiators
and therefore it is not necessarily in their best interest to conclude a deal quickly.
Perhaps the most frustrating part of the entire process is that in the end you
still do not have a finalized "contract" in the Western sense of the word. Chinese
negotiations often involve understanding and intentions not spelled out in the
final contract. These expectations may surface at any point and are often phrased
as "based on our friendship and mutual understanding, could you ... ."1 Often
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these requests have nothing at all to do with the contract terms at all. So even
when things seem finalized, in reality they are continually in negotiations until the
project is actually completed and payment is received.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE MARKET
3.1 MARKET CONDITIONS
The expense and hassel of doing business in China is tremendous. Beyond
the mere problems of being away from home and the lengthy and trying
negotiations, Western representatives must deal with inadequate living and
working conditions. Several firms have actually decided to maintain their
registration but to wait to actually open offices until conditions improve. The
problems go far beyond just expense. There is simply a severe lack of available
facilities to suit the lifestyles of foreign representatives.
Housing and apartment space, not to mention office space, is virtually
unheard of. The vast majority of foreign representatives live and work out of hotel
rooms. This space is also virtually impossible to find due to the substantial growth
in the tourist industry. Even when rooms are available these spaces are cramped
and inadequate for companies needs. Firms often spend a good deal of time
modifying hotel rooms to suit their purposes.
The telecommunications system is a disaster. In order to avoid hotel
switchboards, which are often busy, firms must install direct phone lines and the
waiting list is long. (70,000 applicants in Shanghai at the end of 1986.)1
Office equipment and supplies are scarce and usually imported with duties of
30-100%.2 Computers and word processing are non-existent and photocopying
is only available at the major hotels. Secretaries, translators, and drivers are also
in very short supply.
Many goods that Westerns desire are unavailable. Shampoo, for example,
can be very difficult to find. Although the textile industry is of major importance to
the Chinese economy, western style clothes are not readily available.
Restaurants serving western foods are few and far between and supplies of these
foods are inconsistent and difficult to find. Many foreigners in Guangzhou have
resorted to periodically going to Hong Kong to shop for food and other goods,
encountering customs duties as high as 100% of purchase price when bringing
items back into China.3
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Recreational and educational facilities are in short supply as well. The
International Club in Shanghai is one of the few exceptions boasting an outdoor
pool, tennis, and bowling.4 Educationally foreign-language schooling is not
readily available. While there is an American School of Guangzhou and another
in Shanghai, this is not near enough to alleviate the demand. Foreign language
entertainment is also very difficult to find and although the major hotels have
promised to help in this area but as of now little effort has eally been made.
The need for development which addresses these conditions is apparent.
Firms are certainly experiencing problemns and facing constraints which more
and better facilities could alleviate. Many companies will only consider sending
executives without children to avoid the problem of schooling. Among
businessmen, depression and burnout are a major problem. These problems
could be addressed with more development for foreign nationals.
3.2 QUANTIFICATION OF DEMAND
There can be little doubt that demand exists for additional space in China. The
fact that foreign nationals are paying $72,000/year for a 1000 sq. ft. apartment in
Beijing indicates that there is a large pent-up demand, even in a city that has
already experienced a large amount of foreign investment in real estate.
Demand, both at the present time and in the near future, seems to be
concentrated in Beijing/Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. While demand in
secondary locations, such as the coastal cities and smaller industrial cities, would
appear to be a few years (and a few reforms) away.
Demand for space is a function not only of the volume of foreign business
activity in the country but also of the volume of tourists who are competing for this
space. Since tourist business is more lucrative many hotels have not permitted
companies to rent space preferring if need be to keep rooms vacant in the
short-run to capitalize on the tourist trade. This makes space scarcer and more
expensive. Exhibit 7 gives tourism figures since 1980. These numbers seem to
indicate that the tourist market has peaked and is now experiencing a declining
rate of growth. If this decline continues then the projections for 1988-90 would be
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as shown in these exhibits. If correct this would indicate less competition from the
tourist industry for available space.
Demand from the business community is much more difficult to determine.
Figures are not available for the number of businessmen or foreign companies in
China over the past ten years. Therefore, attempting to link demand from foreign
executives to the amount of foreign business activity would seem appropriate.
Unfortunately, the economic data does not indicate any general trends. Instead,
the high growth rates between 1984 and 1985 indicate that shifts in China's
economic policy are the major determinants of growth. Therefore, projections of
business demand need to be tied to predictions about future economic policy
decisions and are thus related to the political stability of the country.
3.3 QUANTIFICATION OF SUPPLY
At the present time China is undergoing a major building boom spurred by the
surge into China following the introduction of the open door policy in 1980.
Exhibit 8 gives and indication of the amount of activity involving foreign
investment which is currently underway. Obviously responding to demand, there
has been a major concentration of activity in the Beijing/Tianjin, Shanghai, and
Guangzhou/Shenzen regions.
The amount of development in these three areas accounts for more than
two-thirds of all the foreign invested real estate development in the country. By
f- the end of the decade, Beijing/Tianjin and Shanghai are expected to add
15-20,000 hotel rooms each. Guangzhou/Shenzen officials are anticipating over
10,000 additional rooms. The rest of China is predicting completion of
approxiamately 15,000 rooms. Therefore, we see a close correlation between
concentration of demand and proposed supply.
3.4 CUSTOMER PROFILE
There are two strategies which companies use in doing business in China
which divide them into two very different groups with differing needs. There are
companies which send representatives to China for short durations of time (1-2
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weeks) when needed. For these companies hotels are probably the most cost
effective means of housing their employees. However, the vast majority of
companies have representatives in China for much longer durations of time. The
needs of this group for housing, office space, recreation, food, clothes, etc. are far
different. This is the group that the proposed project is targetted to serve. Data
indicates that these companies make up approxiamatley 60% of the companies
currently doing business in China.
In general, these companies can be divided into two groups. Those who
began operations in China in the 1980-81 time period and those who opened
offices between 1985-86. There are slight differences between these two groups
which could be important. The companies which entered during the earlier time
frame seem to be more happy with their living and working conditions than the
companies which entered later. Overall, they rate their space better on quality
and price.
The typical company has roughly 2.7 representatives who currently do
business in China. On average, the companies also intend to increase
representation by 50% by 1990. Beijing is without a doubt the number one city for
doing business both now and in the forseeable future. Shanghai appears to be
second, followed by Tianjin and Guangzhou.
Most company representatives live in hotels with a very few actually renting
apartments. The reason is definately lack of alternatives rather than choice. Most
companies rent this space on a long-term basis receiving some cost reductions.
The average long-term customer rents roughly 1000 square feet of space. Prices
vary drastically ranging anywhere from $5/sq. ft./year to $85/sq. ft./year.
The consensus is that overall living conditions are below average. Availability
of recreational facilities ranks lowest on everyones scale. Availability of space,
price, and food rank cosiderably better but still below average. Representatives
rank their living space highest on comfort, cleanliness, and accessability to the
office but these ratings still do not reach 5 on a 1-7 scale.
Companies choose to rent additional space for offices rather than have their
living space serve for both. The number one location is once again hotel rooms
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with some firms locating there beacause of a lack of alternatives and others due
to preferance. Most space is still rented on a long term basis with the average firm
renting 1000 square feet. Prices range from $38/sq. ft./year to $67/sq. ft./year.
Overall, office space rates slightly higher than living space averaging 4.2 on a 7
point scale. Availability and cost are the two major problems while suitability rates
just above average. Average ratings for services provided range between 4.4 and
5.0 with many firms supplying their own.
No matter what their current living and working conditions all the
representatives agree that there is definately a need for more adequate housing
and office space. Over two-thirds would like to rent space in the proposed project.
However, all of them also agree that they would not be willing to pay more than
they are currently paying. Most representatives would hope to find such a project
in either Beijing or Shanghai with Tianjin, Guangzhou, and a couple smaller
coastal and industrial cities also which were mentioned. Quality office space with
good telecommunications facilities would be an important consideration as would
outdoor recreational facilities.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS/CONCLUSIONS
4.1 THE MARKET
The popular belief is that the tourist boom in China has already experienced
most of its growth and most economists project that growth rates will continue to
decline. Thus, there will be a corresponding leveling out in the total number of
tourists visiting China. The common projection is also that the current building
boom will translate into a overbuilt market in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou
by 1990. Even if this is true and there is a minimal increase in the size of the
business market there will still be opportunities for projects similar to the one
proposed.
First, the proposed project is different in nature than 92.5% of the projects now
being undertaken. The vast majority of the projects currently underway are
nothing more than hotels. They do provide additional space but it is more suited
to the tourist and short term business traveler than the business executive who
must eside in China for six months at a time. Apartment and office complexes
represent a very small percentage of the development activity in the country. Of
the projects which do fit this category, one or two may provide the additional
amenities such as recreational facilites, stores, restaurants, and entertainment.
This means that these new facilities really don't provide any additional services to
business representatives that they don't already have. My survey responses
indicate that if a project such as the one proposed were to exist then
representatives would definately be interested in switching from their present
hotel locations. Therefore, I believe that even if the growth in demand does
continue to slow down and the market does indeed become overbuilt, the
differentiation of the project will lead to switching of location by foreign executives
assuming a comparable price can be maintained.
Second, even if we assume that growth in market demand will be minimal,
overbuilding will occur, and the product is not sufficiently differentiated to
encourage switching, opportunities will still exist in secondary cities. As I have
already stated, over two-thirds of all the development activity in China is occuring
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in the Beijing/Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou/Shenzen regions. Therefore,
whereas these three locations may indeed become overbuilt there are still
several cities demonstrating encouraging signs of economic growth which I
believe are ripe for potential increases in foreign business activity and thus are
potential locations for developemt projects targetted at foreign executives.
Potential areas for growth include the SEZs, the special coastal cities and some
interior cities such as Nanjing, Wuhan, and Chonqing. Therefore, even if
overbuilding does occur in the larger cities, secondary locations such as these
should provide development opportunities, perhaps not in the next two or three
years but certainly before the end of the century.
So far I have assumed that the projections of a decline in tourism will in fact
happen and that increases in business activity will be minimal. However, I do not
believe that this will actually happen because I feel that the popular analysis is
flawed.
People are looking at the declining growth rate in tourism over the past two
years and assuming that this indicates a levelling out of the tourist industry in
China. I have a basic problem with this. I believe China has not yet reached its
peak in tourist travel. Looking at the data for China, if tourism were to level out
then the number of tourists visitng China would be roughly 35 million in 1990.
Comparing this to data for other countries I simply believe that the 35 million
figure is a considerable underestimation. The international tourist industry has
been growing at a rapid rate with world travel is up 67% over the 1975-85 time
period. There has also been a shift in the destination of travel away from Atlantic
rim countries to Pacific rim countries. Therefore, I do not believe the drop in
growth rate of tourist arrivals in China is the beginning of a continuing downward
trend. It is merely a trough in a cycle.
I believe that the economic planning cycle of the PRC is effecting the tourist
data. The planning cycle in China is 5 years long. Economic plans are generated
every five years for each half decade. (ie. The sixth 5-year plan is for 1981-85 and
the seventh plan is for 1986-90.) Due to the nature of the planning and
implementation process investment also experiences a 5 year cycle based
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roughly on a 1-2 year time lag from the beginning of the planning cycle. I think
that the declining growth rate in the tourist industry is just an indication that there
is pent-up demand. Basically, the growth rate in the number of tourists is dropping
because there is a shortage of available space and as investment picks up in
1987-88 more projects will be completed and the growth rate will rebound. The
test of this hypothesis will be in what happens with the 1988 tourist figures. In any
case, if tourist growth should rebound then I would expect a fairly healthy market
for continued development work even in cities such as Beijing and Shanghai.
CONCLUSION: The potential definately exisits for real estate development in
the Chinese market.
4.2 THE INDUSTRY
Generally, the ability to successfully schedule, coordinate, and manage a
project is the key determinant of its success. While these skills are still very
important, managing the local and central government officials is the number one
barrier to success in China.
The actual structure of the industry and sequencing of events are not
drastically different in post-reform China than in the US. There is similarity in the
multiplicity and types of players involved and other than putting a project team
together a little earlier otherwise might occur the overall sequencing of the project
is identical. The materials and construction techniques are slightly different but
these factors can be accounted for up front in the planning, design, and
scheduling of the project so that they do not present problems later on.
In addition, the Chinese government has also been rather ameniable to real
estate developers recently. The leadership realizes that foreign investment and
technology transfer are necessary if China is ever to achieve its objectives.
Developers provide both of these as well as increase the capital stock of the
country. This has given developers a strong bargaining position and they have
been able to convince the Chinese to relax constraints which have allowed them
to operate even more normally than might otherwise be permitted.
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However, as the reforms have made managing the project easier,
negotiations have become tougher. I have already discussed the difference in
negotiating style and philosophies. The idiosyncracies can be very frustrating and
potentially misleading. Making sure that you really understand what you are
agreeing to can be difficult and may mean the difference between success and
failure.
The changes in the industry also mean that the amount and importance of
negotiations has been increased. The switch from competitive bids to negotiated
contracts means much more time and money is spent in trying to win the contract.
Therefore, from the firm side their is increased incentive and necessity to make
every negotiation pay off in a project. The importance of the negotiations has
perhaps been elevated even more from the Chinese' perspective. The reforms
have greatly reduced the ability of the government to control the inputs (labor,
materials, and equipment) of a project. So, with the traditional means of control
greatly limited, the state now has only the negotiating process to govern a project.
Therefore, from the Chinese side the negotiations are also critical.
In addition to simply the initial negotiations, monitoring and maintaining
relationships is also a central criteria for success. As history has shown, the
Chinese political environment can be very volatile in nature. Factions and
policies can change virtually overnight. The continual dynamics paired with the
concentration of power in the party and the state means that potential interference
is always an issue. Maintaining relationships and a strong negotiating position
will lessen the threat of intervention. All of these conditions combined make
strong negotiating the key success factor.
CONCLUSION: The initial explicit and on-going implicit negotiations are of
primary importance in the completion of a successful project.
4.3 THE PRC
The "reformists" faction is a large coalition which at this point in time shows no
signs of breaking up. In fact, the events of the recent Party and People's
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Congresses would indicate that their support is growing even stronger. The
reformists have a very broad based appeal because they represent a
compromise position between the conservative and liberal positions. The
coalition is supported by many of the economists and provicial first party
secretaries not to mention the military, intellectuals, teachers, workers, and
peasants. Since the reforms have appeal to such a large number of groups it will
take a good deal of time for the groups to realign even if the reforms should go
sour. Therefore, I expect the reforms continue and believe that a return to more
centralist policies is out of the question.
The pace at which the reforms will take place is another issue altogether. The
Chinese leadership has kept a very tight leash on the reforms trying to maintain
control and limit problems such as forex expenditure and inflation. So far they
have been very successful at holding back the tide. However, while the voice for
slowing reforms gets more media exposure the voice for speeding up reforms is
getting louder. The student demonstrations of 1987 are evidence of this growing
sentiment. There also seems to be a growing base of support among the workers
and the peasants as well.
The pace may also pick up because there is a snowball effect in enacting
reforms. As one gets passed two others need to be passed in order to make the
first one effective. The ability of the leadership to hold back the reforms while still
appeasing the masses is a delicate balance to maintain and will determine the
speed at which the reforms evolve.
An important factor in this balancing process is the power of the CCP. At the
present time, the power of the Party over the country appears to be diminishing
slightly. This is partially due to a timing issue. The ranking cadres in the Party are
becoming old and there is currently an attempt to transfer key positions to the next
generation of cadre taking place. So far the transition has been very smooth but
the power of the Party is suffering. This can be evidenced by looking at the Party
and state offices that the members of the new Politburo hold. While the Standing
Committee still holds the top positions in both structures, they do not have the
broad base within the Party or state structure that their predecessors exhibitted.
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The other members of the Politburo also hold inferior positions to their
predecessors. It is unclear whether this represents an intentional move by the
Party to seperate the two structures but at the minimum it translates into a lesser
hold over the economy in the short run.
Another cause of the reduction in power is the actual reforms themselves. As
the leadership enacts reforms granting more freedoms, their means of control
over enterprises diminishes. This means that the reforms would need to be
rescinded if control is to be regained. This is unlikely because of the success and
support of the reforms.
An interesting aspect of this reduction in state control is the corresponding
reduction in Party control as well. The Party has traditionally maintained control
over workers through Party cadre placed at each enterprise. The reforms have
removed these cadre from their positions thus eliminating the Party's line of direct
access to the people. This means that they will need to find another avenue of
reaching the masses. Because of the lack of formalized institutions the only
possibility at this time seems to somehow penetrate the family structure. This will
prove very difficult because of the importance of family in the culture.
CONCLUSION: Economic and legal reforms will continue, perhaps at an
accelerated pace. Political reforms will also start to supplement the administrative
reforms already underway and the Chinese Communist Party may potentially
lose their dominant position in the country.
4.4 OVERALL ASSESSMENT
The structure of the development industry provides the freedom needed to
deal with the idiosyncracies of working in China. The culture of development is to
take risks. The project orientation of the business allows a developer to take
these risks while limiting his exposure. Thus developers are often willing and
able to accept higher levels of risk than other businesses.
The project orientation and site specific nature of the product gives the
developer experience in dealing with ever changing relationships on every
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project and product adaptation for each location. This framework provides
flexibility which allows a developer to quickly adapt his team or product to suit
local requirements. These capabilities of flexibility and adaptation are essential if
a company hopes to succeed in China.
Second, few companies can align their own interests so completely with the
objectives of the Chinese leadership. The goals and the process of China's "four
modernizations" compliment the objectives of a foreign developer. The Chinese
leadership, while actively promoting reforms, is very cautious about the pace at
which they should take place. They favor slow and steady growth in an attempt to
keep things from growing beyond their control. This often creates a pent-up
demand for goods and services. To a developer this is like money in the bank
because it means that his building will be fully occupied and that he can charge
higher rates due to the pent-up demand.
The modernizations are to be achieved with increased foreign investment and
technology transfer. These are two things which a foreign developer is happy to
provide. A developer would much rather deal with the certainties of Western
financial institutions than the uncertainty of the Chinese financial system. A
developer would also prefer to work with more sophisticated Western architects,
engineers, and contractors because they are more likely to understand his
objectives and have the capabilities to manage his project successfully.
Finally, a major concern among the Chinese is the generation of foreign
exchange. This is essential if the economy is to progress and the modernizations
are to succeed. However, China is forever fighting a shortage of foreign
exchange. Encouraging real estate development is a good way to earn foreign
exchange because when land or space is leased to foreign nationals it ensures a
steady stream of foreign exchange for whatever the duration of the lease.
P *CONCLUSION: Few companies could move into China as quickly and as
easily as a real estate developer.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE NEXT STEP
5.1 THE MARKET
After nine months of researching the People's Republic of China I have
selected 5 cities which I would select for further analysis. Since location is
everything in development these five cities were chosen 1) for their economic
base, 2) perhaps more importantly, for what I believe are their strategic locations
within the country.
Nanjing is a city of approxiamately 2,250,000 located in Jiangsu province
about 150 miles WNW of Shanghai. It has a strong industrial base providing a
source of relatively skilled labor which should appeal to foreign manufacturing
firms. It's location is also ideal. The experience of the Beijing/Tianjin,
Guangzhou/Shenzen regions indicate that there is a piggyback effect of an
established business center encouraging the development of a nearby city. As
Shanghai continues to become more overcrowded and expensive its proximity
Vshould have spillover effects. The location of Nanjing is also good from a
transportation standpoint. It is a relatively short distance from the ports of
Shanghai. It is on one of the rail lines leading to Shanghai. It is also located on
the Yangtze River which provides access not only to Shanghai but also to the
interior of the country. This combination of site and industrial base should attract
foreign investment in manufacturing.
Wuhan is centrally located with respect to the economic activity and
development of the country. It is located in Hubei province. It too has an industrial
base but is most important for its strategic location at a crossroads for several
means of transportation. First, Wuhan is on the Yangtze river which extends from
Nanjing and Shanghai to the east to Chongqing to the west. Second, it is an
important crossroads for roads leading toward Bejing, Shanghai, Guangzhou,
Chongqing, and Xian. Third, It is the major intersection for the
Shanghai-Chongqing and Beijing-Guangzhou rail routes. Therefore, Wuhan
provides a variety of transportation alternatives and access to all parts of the
country. As China continues to open its consumer markets Wuhan's importance
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as a transportation hub will become increasingly important and it should attract
firms looking for a location for centralized sourcing and distribution throughout the
country.
Chongqing is a city of 2,780,000 located in Sichuan province. Sichuan
province is extremely important as the bread basket of the country. It was also a
primary region of development during the Maoist era as a "second front" location.
Although not the capital of the province it is certainly an economic center for the
area. It too is situated along the banks of the Yangtze about 500 miles from
Wuhan and 1000 miles from the ocean and the ports of Shanghai. It is a
potentially attractive location not only because of its importance to Sichuan and
its links to the east but also for its positioning in the extreme interior of the country.
Although still about 1000 miles from Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, it is one of the
"developed" cities located furthest west. As such, it is an ideal staging area and
jumping off point for destinations further west and could serve as a strategic
location for channelling goods from western provinces back to the eastern ports.
Dalian and Fuzhou are similar in that they are both east coast ports. Dalian is
located to the north in the highly industrialized province of Liaoning. Its
positioning on the coast where the Yellow Sea meets Bo Hai makes it a
strategically important location. It is already an important port for the import of
materials to and the export of products from the manufacturers in the province
and continued growth in the manufacturing capabilities of the northeast will boost
its importance. Fuzhou is located about midway between Shanghai and
Guangzhou in Fujian province. It is important because of its location immediately
across the Formosa Strait from Taiwan. I believe that Fuzhou will show
tremendous growth as the Taiwanese continue increasing their economic activity
with the mainland. Although probably not the first site which might come to mind
because of the existence of the Xiamen Special Economic Zone about 150 miles
to the south, I feel that Fuzhou will develop further than Xiamen because of the
isolation of Xiamen on an off-shore island.
In addition to these five cities, it will always be wise to keep an eye on Beijing,
Shanghai, and Guangzhou for future possibilities. One final area which should
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also be watched closely is Hainan island of Guangdong province. The Chinese
have announced plans to make the entire island an SEZ. While at this point in
time the idea seems like an overly ambitious undertaking, it could prove more
reasonable in the future if the reforms continue and may be a future boom for real
estate development.
Any specific analysis for these various cities would be structured along the
same lines as this paper but on a more localized scale. It would be important to
assess the political-state structure from the provincial party first secretary on
down. Analyzing the local industry structure and defining what materials,
equipment, and labor are available and who the better contractors are and what
skills are available would also be an important task. Of course, attempting to
quantify demand and supply will always be an important task in determining the
feasibility of any project. An analysis which proceeds along these lines should
provide the necessary specificity to make a final analysis about the feasibility of a
specific project proposal.
5.2 THE INDUSTRY
5.2.1 SKILLS ENHANCEMENT
As I concluded in the previous chapter, the key success factor for doing
business in China is the ability to negotiate. Therefore, I suggest that the very first
step that any businessman in any industry take when planning on doing business
in China is prepare to negotiate.
One, learn as much as possible about the Chinese negotiatiors. I would
suggest that a good place to start would be to read a translation of The Art of War
by the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu. Although written about conducting war
during the period of the warring states in China it has significant relevance. If read
with a business attitude or perspective it is very enlightening into the thought
process of the Chinese and will be helpful in understanding the philosophy
behind the actual negotiations.
56
Two, know yourself, your strengths and more importantly your weaknesses,
and prepare. Having read the book select your team wisely. Get your team
together and practice your negotiating techniques. Decide what tact you are
going to take and who is going to play what roles. You may even wish to adopt
some of Sun Tzu's tactics as well. Expect the unexpected and plan how you are
going to deal with it. Know ahead of time that the negotiations will be frustrating
and maintain control no matter what happens. Be respectful yet prepare like you
are going into battle because the Chinese certainly will. After reading the book
you will understand more fully how important all of this will be. Remember, the
initial negotiations can determine the succes or failure of an entire project.
5.2.2 SHORT TERM PLAN
In the short term I would look to establish a strong development team which
would definantely include a developer, a financeer, and a contractor and
potentially include a designer as well. This team would be made up of foreign
nationals probably not of the same country. I believe this kind of diversity could
provide a flexibility which may come in handy at some point in time. I would plan
on having a Hong Kong financeer, a Japanese or Korean contractor, and a
European or American design firm. Assuming the other parties agree I would form
a partnership with the other companies. A partnership gives each party incentive
to make sure that not just their individual piece of the project works but that the
project as a whole is successful and they will work together to achieve this end.
From the developers standpoint the partnership will diminish much of the risk that
he must take. Everyone can be given equity in the project and this can release
the developer from much of his indebtedness to the other parties.
In establishing this partnership you naturally look for experience. However,
finding companies with experience in the PRC can be extremely difficult.
Therefore, the next best thing is to look for companies that have experience in
Malaysia, Indonesia, or other South-East Asian countries. If even this is difficult,
look around. There are plenty of companies still trying to get into China. Take a
close look at these firms and evaluate which ones have really done their
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homework and which ones are simply trying to get into the market because it is
the thing to do. Many companies haven't really prepared themselves for actually
doing business in China and these companies will probably experience severe
problems. Having selected your team and assuming you have what you believe
is a viable project then approach the Chinese officials with your proposal.
5.2.3 LONG TERM PLAN
I believe that there will be a significant change in the domestic construction
industry. The Chinese are very eager to learn and with every joint venture project
they collect more and more skills and information. As one American contractor put
it, "they vacuum clean your files." For the time being the Chinese contractors will
continue to supply basically labor and domestic sourcing of materials and
equipment to the best of their abilities. However, as they gain more knowledge
and skills the foreign firms will become less important.
The key for foreign firms then is to attempt to maintain a technology gap
between themselves and the Chinese firms. If they are able to accomplish this
they will be able to maintain their advantage and thus their attractiveness.
However, based on the interviews that I have had I believe that many firms don't
even realize that the problem potentially exists. Of the one's which do, few have
developed a strategy for dealing with the issue. Therefore, I believe that the
majority of firms will probably lose their technological edge.
When this time comes, I believe that the Chinese will enact new regulations
requring that at least domestic contractors and potentially designers be used for
any project. This will require a change in the team structure to the use of Chinese
companies. The developer has several options in this situation. 1) He could
simply decide that he no longer wishes to do business in China and leave.
2) Realizing what could happen in the future he could spend some time and effort
in the short term evaluating domestic firms and monitoring their progress. Then
when the time came he would already have a knowledge base on which to base
his selection. 3) The developer could try to use the same Chinese joint venture
partners for all of his near term projects. This would allow the developer to
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already have an established working relationship with a domestic firm when the
new regulations are enacted. Therefore, his choice of domestic firms become
easier and the effects of the change in the team can be minimized.
5.3 THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
The political structure of the PRC and the CCP in particular still play a
dominate role in the determination of the future direction of the country and the
policies which they pass determine what will really occur in the market and the
industry. The views that I have expressed are based on my evaluation of the
Chinese environment at this point in time and the assumptions which I have
made concerning future reforms. These actions may not necessarily take place.
Therefore, it is always important to continually monitor the environment and
update your projections and your corresponding strategy. An important piece of
this is knowing who to watch and what to look for.
If I were trying to monitor the environment I would begin by keeping track of
the reforms that are taking place very closely. They are being developed and
changed very rapidly. This might create a tendency to only superficially monitor
the activity because you might believe it is simply going to change again.
However, there are often very subtle changes which take place (maybe even
simple word changes) that often give clues to the direction that policies will be
taking. Therefore, watch the changes closely and evaluate what each one may
mean to your business.
Second, within the Party and state structure I believe that there is one group
which carries a large amount of influence and should be watched closely. This
group is the provincial party first secretaries. Their role is perhaps the most critical
to the functioning of the entire Party-state system. These individuals are the link
between the policy making at the central government level and the
implementation in the provinces. Without these people the system would not
work. Thus these individuals have large amounts of power due to their role.
Therefore, I would watch this group and assess their feelings and ideas about
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policy decisions because I believe they have great influence in determining the
direction of continuing reforms.
As I stated earlier, the reformists are made up of a large coalition of interest
groups which showed no signs of weakening. However, since this coalition is
behind the reforms any breakdown among them would have significant impact on
the pace of reforms. If a breakdown is going to occur I would look for it to come
from the formation of a smaller coalition which would include the workers, the
peasants, and the students. Although students were not defined earlier as an
interest group in chapter one, the demonstrations of 1987 certainly illustrate the
power that this group possesses. The students realize that they are one key to the
success of the modernizations and could potentially influence many policy
decisions. All of these groups are asking for an even quicker pace for reforms and
if they should decide to unite they would certainly form a formidable team.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE PITCH
The market is experiencing tremendous pent-up demand. Therefore, the
potential exists for considerable market growth. But even if the market does
become overbuilt I believe that this project would have the attributes necessary to
generate substantial switching. There are several steps which I would take in
tapping into this market. To begin, I would place advertisements in periodicals
such as Business China and China Business Review to develop awareness of
the project in the marketplace. I would supplement this with a direct mailing to
companies which currently have operations in China. I would acquire the lists for
this mailing from the various periodicals and from various country state and
commerce departments. This mailing would provide a self-addressed card which
could be returned to get further information. If the card is returned then the
company would be sent an informational packet on the project and providing a
number to call if they wished to speak with a leasing representative. In addition I
would also try to have information distributed in hotels in China which are
frequented by business travelers. If this is not permitted, I would rely on word of
mouth. The network among foreign nationals in China is tightly knit and even if
only a few representatives initially know about the project the word of mouth
awareness that will be achieved should alleviate any problems. In any case,
there would be a marketing and sales office in the city where the project is being
constructed and I would hope to have a model unit built as well. The strategy will
be to compete based on product differentiation. The proposed project is a more
complete living environment than a standard hotel. Therefore, the message
concept will be to push the various project attributes.
The financeer is perhaps the most difficult of all the players to sell the project
to. This makes sense since he is the one with the money on the line. These
individuals are very tied to numbers and returns. Therefore, a risk/return analysis
using realistic discount rates to account for doing business in China is probably
the best way to sell them on the project. This means that the analysis of the local
environment needs to be fairly specific and accurate. The projections a should
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estimate cash outflows based upon the costs of construction and the cash inflows
basde upon the projected absorption rate for the project. In the end, if the
assumptions seem reasonable and the project looks profitable you will probably
be able to persuade the financeer.
The design and construction firms will probably be the easiest players to
convince. These firms are traditionally just concerned with getting volume of
business. However, it may be difficult to convince them to enter into a partnership.
Traditionally, these firms like to take very few risks so convincing them to accept
an equity position in a project may be difficult. The way to approach this may be to
explain that although many firms have experienced some problems in their own
previous dealings in China, a relationship through the developer should alleviate
the problems. The firm no longer needs to worry about payment schedules or the
form of payment. The developer also has a little better bargaining position since
he is bringing in foreign investment capital so he is in a better position to
pursuade officials to allow outside sourcing and greater control over labor. In any
case, even if the design or construction firm will not enter into a partnership you
can still simply pay them on a normal project basis.
The Chinese government is not necessarily the hardest player to sell on the
project but will certainly be the most difficult. First of all, knowing who you really
need to speak with is extremely difficult. The institutions and processes are not
well defined and finding your way through the maze can prove virtually
impossible. The other primary problem is in knowing what the Chinese official's
objectives are. This is often not clear and can change as one moves from one
level of the structure to another. However, in the end I believe that because the
developer is bringing in foreign investment, foreign technology, and increasing
the capital stock of the country the officials will approve the project.
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Beijing Interna-
tional Country
Club
Foreign investor/developer
Expert Base Development
Ltd of Hong Kong
PRC investor/developer
Dragon and Clouds Ltd of
Miyun county
Investment*
15
Date Size, other details
1988 com- Complex on 712
pletion; July hectares 70 km
1986 con- north of Peking,
tract; 15-year with 200-room
term hotel, 80 apart-
ments, 20 houses,
sports, business, and
conference facilities
Diaoyutai Hotel
Liangmahe
Tourist Center
Lido Holiday Inn
Hotel (extension)
Longquan Hotel
Tian An (Peking) Invest-
ment Co of Hong Kong
Yan Kong Enterprises of
Hong Kong
Yick Ho Co of Hong
Kong
Tak Wing Construction
(Holding) Co of Hong
Kong
Beijing Diaoyutai Economic
Development Co
Beijing Travel Bureau
China International
Travel Service
Beijing Jinxi Economic
Development Corp
42 Sept. 1986
contract
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Late 1986
completion
12 1986 com-
pletion; Dec.
1985 con-
tract; 15-year
term
To be located
south of the
.Diaoyutai State
Guest House
400-unit apartment
building
Two- and three-bed-
room apartments
235-room villa; Tak
Wing management in
first seven years
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Garden Villas
Guangming Apart-
ments
Huatai Apartments
IBM Apartment
Complex
Al- Rayes Group Trading
Co of Kuwait
Toko Shoji of Japan
Hua Tai Corp of Thailand
IBM of the US
International Hotel n.a.
International
Overseas Chinese
Service Center
International
Village
Jinguang Hotel
n.a.
M.W. Kellogg Co of the
US
Kumagai Gumi Co of
Japan
Poly Technologies,
China International Trust
-and Investment Co
Beijing Agriculture
Administration
Nanmofang Agriculture
Commerce Corp
Beijing Farm Administra-
tion
n.a.
Beijing Overseas Chine'se
Affairs Office
China National Technical
Import Corp
Shum Yip (Holdings) Co,
Chaoyang District Hua-
yang Development Corp
70 End-1987
completion
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
100
n.a.
Early 1987
completion
End-1986
completion
n.a.
n.a.
Late 1986
completion
1988 com-
pletion; 15-
year term
389-unit residential
villa on 227,000-sq-
m site by Wenyu River
136-unit apartment/
office complex
126-unit apartment
building
100 prefabricated
houses with recrea-
tion facilities
Work under way
Project not yet final-
ized
150 single-family
houses, 80 townhouses,
and 250-unit apart-
ment building
53-story, 500-room
hotel/office complex;
to be managed by New
World Hotels Interna-
tional of Hong Kong
on
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Project
China Science and
Technology Ex-
change Center
China World Trade
Center
Dadu Hotel
(extention)
Dongzhimen Com-
plex
Foreign Experts
Apartments
Foreign investor/developer
Noble Chong and Associa-
ted Co of Canada
Kerry Industrial Co of
Hong Kong
n.a.
Jardine Matheson Co of
Hong Kong
n.a.
PRC investor/developer
China National Publica-
tion Import-Export
Corp
China Foreign Economic
Relations & Trade Con-
sultant Corp (Consultec)
of MOFERT
n.a.
Capital Iron & Steel
Development Corp
n.a.
Investment* Date
40 Late 1986
completion
280
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
1987 first-
phase com-
pletion; Dec.
1984 con-
tract; 20-year
term
Late 1987
completion
1987 com-
pletion
n.a.
Size, other details
400-room hotel, 100-
unit office, 100-unit
apartment, and ex-
hibition complex
1,100-room hotel,
450-unit office, 500-
unit apartment, ex-
hibition, and con-
ference complex;
whole project to be
completed by 1990
Construction under
way
40 houses, 110-unit
apartment and 38-
unit office complex;
work under way
200-unit apartment
project; work under
way
I I I Il i 1
IOlympic Hotel Jiaxing (China) Investment China Sports Service Co
Co of Hong Kong
n. a. 1987 com-
pletion; May
1985 con-
tract
11-story, 400-room
hotel on 30,000-sq-
m site; under con-
struction by Mitsui
Construction Co of
Japan
Oriental Hotel
Overseas Chinese
International
Hotel
Peace Hotel
(extension)
Sang Hee Hotel
Scriven Trading of Hong
Kong
Sino-America International
Engineering (CAIE, a JV
between Bechtel of the US
and China National Coal
Development Corp)
Viobright International
Investment of Hong Kong
(subsidiary of Ever-
bright Co)
Extra Wealth Investment
Co of Hong Kong
Oriental Hotel Co
Capital Overseas Chinese
Services Co
Beijing Municipal Hotel
Services Co
Beijing East District
Zhongxin Economic
Development Co,
Beijing International
Trust & Investment Corp
7 1984 con-
tract; 1 0-year
term
200
250-room hotel
1987 com- 800-room hotel and
pletion 400-unit apartment/
office complex on
36,000-sq-m site
13 Late 1987
completion;
July 1984
contract; 10-
year term
15 Dec. 1984
contract; 14-
year term
300-room hotel
300-room hotel
*US$ millions.
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SAS Hotel
Sino-America
Hotel
Summer Palace
Hotel
Tiantan Hotel
Tiantan Sportsmen
Inn (extension)
Ting Song Lu
Hotel
Wangfujing Hotel
Foreign investor/developer PRC investor/developer
Skanska Co and SAS
International Hotels of
Scandinavian Airlines
System (both of Sweden)
OS International (US agen
of Shearson Lehman
Brothers)
. Valin Enterprises of Hong
Kong
Hengtaiyuan Co of Hong
Kong
n.a.
Gold Spint Co of Hong
Kong
Kumagai Gumi Co of
Japan (70% equity)
China International
Exhibition Center
t Friendship Co of Beijing
No. 1 Commercial
Bureau
Beijing Summer Palace
Tourist Co
Beijing Yanjing Econom-
ic Development Co
National Athletic Com-
mission
Bamboo Garden Hotel
Shum Yip (Holdings) Co
(30% equity)
Investment*
43.8
Date
1989 com-
pletion; July
1986 agree-
ment
80 June 1985
letter of
intent
4.2
n.a.
n.a.
'0.75
Aug. 1984
contract; 11-
year term
May 1985
contract
n.a.
Jan. 1983
contract; 10-
year term
50 End-1987
completion
Size, other details
400-room hotel on
33,000-sq-m site in-
side the China Inter-
national Exhibition
Center
25- to 30-story hotel
74-room hotel
n.a.
Project not yet
finalized
n.a.
17-story, 610-room
hotel
ii f 1 I
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Xiyuan Hotel,
(extension)
. Xuanwumen Hotel
(extension)
Yanshan Hotel
(extension)
Yuandong Hotel
(reconstruction)
Yuyang Hotel
n.a.
n.a.
Singapore partner
n.a.
Beijing Hotel Service Co
Beijing
Service
Service
Hong Kong partner
n.a.
Novel Enterprise of Hong
Kong, Accor of France
Asahi Trading, Sanwa
'Bank, United Capitals
(all of Japan)
Taisei Corp of Japan,
RKB Ltd of Malaysia
Food and Drink
Co; Beijing Hotel
Co
Fuerli Co
Peking municipal govern-
ment
China National Aero-Tech-
nology Import-Export Corp;
Beijing Animal Husbandry-
Industry-Commerce Co
Beijing Economic Develop-
ment Co, Changping Pre-
fecture Agriculture- Industry.
Commerce United Enterprise
China National Metals and
Minerals Import-Export
Corp, Sijiqing Agricultural
Cooperative
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
-Late 1988
completion
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
30 1987 com-
pletion; 14-
year term
V10
billion
n.a.
34 End-1i 986
completion
420-unit office,
apartment, and
hotel complex
350-room hotel;
seeking foreign
partners
300-unit apartre'nt
complex
n.a.
620-room hotel; to
be managed by
Accor
Resort villa with'golf
course located near
the Ming Tombs
24-story, 672-room
hotel located at
Zizhuyuan Park
i ~·
Project
Aijian Building
Block 4
Chcngqiao Hotel
China Youth
Hotel
Dingshan Hotel
Exhibition Center
Evergreen Hotel
Garden Hotel/
Jinjiang Club
Foreign investor/developer
IMC (Overseas) Co
and Shui On (China),
both of Hong Kong
n.a.
Shui On of Hong Kong
n.a.
Portman Group of the
US, Kajima of Japan
Indar of Hong Kong
Nomura Securities of
Japan
PRC investor/developer
Shanghai Patriotic Con-
struction Corp
n.a.
China Youth Travel
.Service
n.a.
Shanghai Exhibition
Center
Shanghai Chinese
Medicine Academy
Jinjiang Holdings
Investment* Date
17 Oct. 1988
completion;
May 1985
contract; 10-
year term
n.a. 1986 com-
pletion
18 1988 com-
pletion
n.a.
175
1987 com-
pletion
Size, other details
28-story office/residential
complex, with 200 resi-
dential units, conference
facilities, shopping center,
restaurants, and gymnasium
200-room hotel
300-room hotel
200-room hotel
1989 com- 700-room hotel; to be
pletion managed by Peninsula
30 n.a.
60 1988 com-
pletion; 16-
year term
n.a.
34-story, 500-room hotel;
to be managed by Okura;
started construction in May
1986
n
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Golden Tulip
International Hotel
Hailun Hotel
Hongkou Hotel
Hongqiao Hotel
Hongqiao Villa
Huashan Lu
Hotel
*US$ mll/ione.
Golden Tulip Inter-
national (jointly, owned
by Royal Dutch Airlines,
Ballast Nedam, Philips
Electronics, International
Muller, and Airfacts)
Xiangshan Co of the
US
Kingway Shipping Co
n.a.
Marubeni Corp and Dai-
wa House Industry Co,
both of Japan
n.a.
Shanghai No. 2 Com-
merce Bureau
Shanghai Xinya Holdings "n.a.
Shanghai Sioing
Development
Shanghai Tourism Corp
Shanghai Foreign Trade
Corp
n.a. n.a.
1988 com-
pletion
1987 com-
pletion; July.
1985 contract
1987 com-
pletion
1987 com-
pletion
600-room hotel; to be
managed by Golden Tulip;
project not finalized
30-story, 500-room hotel;
occupies 2,600 sq m on
Nanjing Road
800-room hotel
648-room hotel
1988 com- 183 two-story houses; 48
pletion houses for Japanese res-
idents with servant's
quarters, to be completed
by 1986; covers 22 acres,-
including tennis courts, res-
idents' club, shopping
center
n.a. 200-room hotel
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Huating Hotel
Huguang Mansion
Foreign investor/developer PRC investor/developer Investment* Date
n.a. Shanghai Tourism Corp
H.C. Tang and other *
Hong Kong businessmen
(30% equity)
n.a. (70% equity)
75 Mid-1986
completioi
25 Mid-1985
"" contract
Size, other details
1,236-room hotel; to be
n managed by Sheraton; con
struction started in Aug.
1983
30-story commercial build-
ing with shopping arcade
International Air-
port Hotel .
Jincang Mandarin
Hotel •
Jingan Hilton
Hotel
Chalon Group of Japan
Chung Sing Develop-
ment Co (50% owned by -
Overseas Union Bank
Group of Singapore)
Cindic Hotel Investment
Co (90% owned by Cindic
Holdings of Hong Kong
and 10% by Hilton of the
US)
Shanghai Hongqiao
Aviation Corp
Jinjiang Holdings, East
China Enterprise Co, and
Bank of China Shanghai
branch
n.a. n.a. n.a.
60 1989 com- 31-story, 600-room hotel;
• pletion; May to be managed by Mandarir
1985 contract (S) Int'l Hotels Pte Ltd of
OUE; borrowed US$55
million from an eight-bank
syndicate in April 1986
Jinjiang Holdings .. 85 -... Mid-1987
completion
43-story, 800-room hotel;
to be managed by Hilton;
borrowed US$85 million
from a 12-bank syndicate
in May 1985
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Jinjiang Hotel
(extension)
Longbai Hotel
Maohai Hotel
Meridien Hotel
Nikko Longbai
Hotel
Pacific Hotel
Hop Ming Co and Ryoden Jinjiang Holdings
Machinery Co, both of
Hong Kong
Shai Bo Co of Hong
Kong
Zhonghang Investment
Co of Hong Kong
US F&T Association of
Hong Kong
Hotel Nikko Shanghai
Investment Co (JV owned
by Japan Airlines 60%,
Industrial 13ank of Japan
(IBJ) 5%, Kumagai 25%,
and United Trading 10%)
Aoki Construction Co
and IBJ, both of Japan
Jinjiang Holdings
Shanghai Foreign Trade
Corp
Shanghai Association for
Science & Technology
Jinjiang Holding Co
Shanghai Hongqiao
Development Corp
60 Late 1987
completion
32 Mid-1987
completion;
14-year
term
40 1987 com-
pletion
40 1987 com-
pletion
47 Late 1987
completion;
20-year
term
1988 com-
pletion
43-story, 728-room hotel;
under negotiation for
Holiday Inn management;
construction started in Ma,
1986
.190 deluxe apartments; bo:
rowed US$28.8 million
from Hongkong & Shangha
Bank, Bank of Communica-
tions, and Kincheng Bank-
ing Corp, 70% guaranteed
by Bank of China Shanghai
Branch
457-room hotel; to be
managed by Hyatt
382-room hotel; to be
managed by Meridien
11-story, 417-room hotel;
to be managed by Nikko;
raised US$4.12 million frorr
IBJ, 70% guaranteed by
SITCO
745-room hotel; project not
finalized
f B 1
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SHANGHAI
Ruijin
Building
Sapra Hotel
Shanghai
Asia Hotel
Shanghai
Center
Shanghai
International
Conference
Center
Foreign investor/developer
Mitsui Construction Co
of Japan
n.a.
Hoi Tung Marine Ma-
chinery Supplies of
Hong Kong
Seacliff (JV between
American International
Group and John Portman
and Associates, both of
US; and Kajima Corp
of Japan)
- n.a.
S .. , .°
PRC investor/developer
Shanghai Donghu Joint
Co
n.a.
Investment*
n.a.
n.a.
Shanghai Ocean Ship-
ping Co
Jinjiang Holdings and
Shanghai Exhibition
Center
Shanghai Municipal
Science Association
Date
n.a.
n.a.
17 1987 com-
pletion
175
S30
1989 com-
pletion;
Sept. 1985
contract
1987 com-
pletion;
work began
in early
1986
Size, other details
28-story, 300- to 400-room
office/apartment building
n.a.
27-story, 380-room hotel;
borrowed V3.4 billion from
Kincheng-Tokyo Finance of
Hong Kong in July 1985
50-story, 700-room hotel;
two 30-story apartment/
office towers; exhibition
hall and 1,000-seat theater;
borrowed HK$145 million
from a syndicate led by
CCIC Finance of Hong
Kong
380-room hotel, with con-
ference facilities; 33,500-
sq-m total floor space; bor-
rowed US$30 million from
a Banque Indosuez-led
syndicate; hotel will be
managed by Air France
1.ram03
Xo
0
(D
CD
(n
(D
5-CL
MCE)m
CD5-
=3
m.0-
1 r
I I I
I II i
I 1 I
Shanghai
Warwick Hotel
Shanghai
Yangtze Hotel
Tangqiao
Hotel
Wing On
Center
Shanghai
World Trade
Center
Xianyuan
Hotel
n.a.
n.a. n.a.
Renful Investment of
Hong Kong
Yun Ke Co and Chin
Pai Co, both of Hong
Kong
Wing On Holdings of
Hong Kong
Industrial Bank of Japan
and Rowa Real Estate
Investment, both of
Japan
An overseas Chinese
businessman
Aoki Construction Co
and Industrial Bank of
Japan, both of Japan
n.a.
Shanghai Min Xing
Hongqiao Development
Minhang Hongqiao
Development Co; Bank
of China Trust & Con-
sultancy Co; Shanghai
Catering Services Co
Shanghai Industrial
Development Corp
Shanghai Foreign Trade
Corp, Shanghai Minhang-
Hongqiao Development
Co
Jinjiang Holdings Co,
SITCO, and Zhongjian
Garden Construction
Corp
Shanghai Tourism Corp
n.a.
18 1987 com-
pletion
40 n.a.
100
150
1988 com-
pletion
1988 com-
pletion; 18-
year, 1985
contract
1987 com-
pletion; Mar.
1985 letter
of intent
60 n.a.
300-room hotel
600-room hotel
Located in Hongqiao
district
700-room hotel; project not
finalized
Two 40-story office/apart-
ment towers in Hongqiao
district
24-story, 750-room hotel/
apartment complex in
Hongqiao district
27-story hotel
SUS$ millions.
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Foreign investor/developer PRC investor/developer Investment* Date ..... Size, other details
n.a.
TIANJIN
Beifang Hotel
Tianjin-Astor
Hotel
Tianjin Foreign
Trade Center Hall
Tianjin Interna-
tional Building
Club Corp of Asia of
the US
Yunion Communication
Co and Tokyo Trading
Co, both of Japan
Zapata (HK) Co of Hong
Kong
Tsinlien Trading Co of
Hong Kong
Consco Investment Co
of Hong Kong
n.a. n.a.
Tanggu Bohai Foreign
Service Co
Tianjin Hotel
Tianjin International
Trust and Investment
Co
Tianjin International
Investment and Engi-
neering Co
March 1985
letter of
intent
June 1984
contract; 11-
year term
3.5
17.5
June 1984
contract; 10-
year term
Aug. 1984
contract; 15-
year term
40 End-1 987
completion;
Oct. 1986
contract; 20-
year term
Club house, to be near
Longbai Hotel, will have
tennis courts and pool
200-room hotel
200-room hotel
Hotel/office complex with
35,000 sq m of floor space
Office/apartment building
with exhibition hall, cafe;
total floor space of 50,000
sq m
Tianjin Lishunde
Hotel (renovation)
Ko Lo Co of Hong Kong Tianjin Tourist Corp 10-20 Mid-1985 Addition of 150 rooms;
started name changed from Tian-
second jin Hotel back to Lishunde
phase Hotel
I i k
Project
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Tianjin Minzu
Hotel
Tianjin No. 1
Hyatt Hotel
Tianjin Shuijin-
gong Hotel
Tianjin Yan Yuan
International
Hotel
Pearl River Catering Co
of Hong Kong
Lethia of Hong Kong
Wou International of
the US
Tianjin Friendship Hotel
Tianjin No. 1 Hotel
Tianjin Travel Corp
Active Building and Civil Tianjin Tourist Corp
Construction (Pte) of
Singapore
n.a. Misawa Homes Co
and Hokvestv Misawa
Homes Co, both of
Japan
Note: V163:US$1; HKS7.8:US$1.
Tianjin International
Trust and Investment
Co
4.7 June 1984
contract; 10-
year term
30 July 1984
contract; 20-
year term
22
22.5
1986 com-
pletion; con-
struction
began May
1985
1986 com-
pletion; June
1984 con-
tract; 15-
year term
1.2 March 1985
contract; 15-
year term
256-room hotel
450-room hotel; borrowed
US$15 million from CTB
Australia Finance in July
1985; to be managed by
Hyatt International Corp
of the US
7-story, 352-room hotel;
built by Gammon Con-
struction (Management)
Co and to be managed by
Peninsula Group, both of
Hong Kong
250-room hotel; borrowed
US$9 million from In-
dustrial Bank of Japan,
Lloyds Bank, and Bank
of America
Apartment building
r I 1 iii
I I I I I I I I I I i i I
Beijing Yanshan
Hotel
Beiwei Hotel
(extention)
Capital Airport
(extention)
Changan Center
Changfugong
Building
Wu Yi Engineering Co,
Hua Chiao Commercial
Bank (both of Hong
Kong)
Swiss Service Corp,
Maruichi Co of Japan
n.a.
Japan Airlines, Hotel New
Otani, Mitsui and Co,
Bank of Tokyo, Nippon
Steel Co, Industrial Bank
of Japan, Mitsubishi Corp
(all of Japan, together
hold 49% equity)
Changfugong Center In-
vestment (CCI) Co of
Japan
Beijing Fuerli Industrial
Corp
Beijing Hotel Service
Corp
Civil Aviation Administra-
tion of China
Peking municipal govern-
ment
Beijing Tourist Corp
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
1988 com-
pletion; June
1986 contract
n.a.
n.a.
17-story, 225-room
hotel; 62-unit
apartment com-
plex
20-story project not,
yet finalized
Project not yet final-
ized
85 1987 com- 25-story, 550-room
pletion hotel, seven-story
office, and 21-story
apartment complex
1988 com-
pletion; Dec.
1984 con-
tract; 14-.
year term
*US millions.
27-story, 512-room
hotel, nine-story
office, and 17-story
apartment complex;
construction to start
in late 1986
i CI I
IProject Foreign investor/developer
Beijing Exhibition
Center Hotel
Beijing Hotel
(extention)
Beijing Interna-
tional Service
Center
Beijing Ningnan
Hotel
Beijing Shangri-La
Hotel
Gulf Inc of Hong Kong
Henry Fok of Hong Kong
Bank of China, Hong
Kong branch
Guangxin Industrial Co
of Hong Kong, Sam
Yeung Construction Co
of Macau
Shangri-La International
Hotel Co of Hong Kong
(49% equity)
PRC investor/developer
Beijing Exhibition Hall
Beijing Hotel Service
Corp
Capital Iron & Steel
Development Corp;
Bank of China Trust and
Consultancy Corp
Guangdong Provincial
Government Beijing
Representative Office
Beijing Zizhu Hotel
Investment* Date
Late 1986
completion;
Dec. 1984
contract;
10-year
term
1986 com-
pletion; 1983
contract; 8-
year term
n.a.
n.a. Construction
began April
1986
40 Sept. 1984
contract; 13-
year term
Size, other details
250-room hotel;
under way next
to the Beijing Ex-
hibition Center
Addition compris-
ing 300 deluxe
rooms
410,000-sq-m com-
plex includes office
building, hotel, and
cultural center
Covers a 24,000-sq-
m site
25-story, 680-room
hotel; borrowed
USS45 million from
a Bank of China-
led 11-bank syndicate
iI
Project
FUJIAN
Huafu Hotel,
Fuzhou
Min-Capital
Building,
,Fuzhou
Xiamen
day Inn
.Xiamen
Holi-
Hotel,
Xiamen Qing-
mengshan Ho-
tel, Xiamen
Wanshi Village,
Xiamen
Xiamen Sea-
view Hotel
Foreign investor/develc
United Trading Group of
Jordan (50% equity)
Quan Sheen of
Kong --
I I I I
I Ii I i I
PRC investor/developer Investment* Date
Fujian Investment En-
terprises Corp (50%
equity)
Hong Fujian Commercial De-
velopment Center; Fujian
Huaxing Investment Corp
Singapore Property In-
vestment (Pte) Co of
Singapore
Yuni Communication
Co of Japan
Tak Kei Long Pte Co of
Singapore
Hong Leong Finance of
Singapore
Xiamen Foreign Con-
struction Engineering
Co
Xiamen Tourist Corp
Xiamen Garden Corp
.31
5.74
n.a.
1.84
9
Xiamen Travel Bureau
End-1i 987
completion;
Dec. 1984
contract; 25-
year term
Dec. 1984
contract; 10-
year term
End-1987
completion
June 1984
contract; 15-
year term
Dec. 1984
contract; 18-
year term
1987 com-
pletion; work
began 1985
Size, other details
25-story, 300-room hotel
n.a.
To be managed by Holiday
Inn
n.a.
n.a.
400-room hotel on
11,200-sq-m site
I I
I I II I i I i I
Shidai Hotel,
Zhangzhou
GUANGDONG
Binjiang Hotel,
Guangzhou
Central Hotel,
Guangzhou
Fengning
Mansion,
Guangzhou
Guangzhou
Cultural
Holiday Inn,
Guangzhou
Best Harvest Trading of-
Hong Kong
C-Ho Co of Hong Kong
a Hong Kong company
Hing Ta Lung Enterprises
of Hong Kong
Lam Cheng (Hong Kong)
Investment Co (subsid-
iary of Lam Cheng
Pte Co of Singapore)
Zhangzhou Guest House;
Longjiang Economic De-
velopment Co; Bank of
China, Zhangzhou branch
Guangzhou International
Trust and Investment
Corp
Guangzhou International
Science, Trade, and
Exhibition Exchange
Center
Guangzhou Municipal
Telecommunication
Bureau
July 1984
contract; 20-
year term
10
n.a.
20.5
Guangzhou Culture De- 25
velopment Corp under
Guangzhou municipal
government
Work began
July 1985;
15-year term
1987 com-
pletion; first
phase open
June 1986
Early 1988
completion;
July 1985
contract; 18-
year term
End-1988
completion;
Sept. 1985
contract
*US$ millions.
n.a.
n.a.
Six-story, 234-room ho-
tel; five exhibition halls,
45 offices, and 400-seat
conference room
25-story, 480-room hotel/
office building
25-story, 418-room hotel
on 3,500-sq-m site; US$30
million loan from Toyo
Trust-led seven-bank syn-
dicate, guaranteed 70% by
Guangdong International
Trust and Investment Corp,
30% by Standard Chartered
I I1 'r; E f
I I i
I I II I I1
Project
Guangzhou
Center,
Guangzhou
Guangzhou
Ocean Hotel,
Guangzhou
Guangzhou
World Trade
Center,
Guangzhou
Meihuacun
Hotel,
Guangzhou
Palace Hotel,
Guangzhou
Tianhe Hotel,
Guangzhou
Foreign investor/developer
Chung Fat Development
of Hong Kong
Yiu Lian Machinery Re-
pairing Works of Hong
Kong
a US company
Chung Kwong Develop-
ment Co of Hong Kong
Sun Luen (Holdings)
Property Development
Co of Macau
Yick Wah (China) Invest-
ment Development Co of
Hong Kong
PRC investor/developer
Guangzhou Shuihua
Property Corp
Guangzhou Ocean Ship-
ping Corp
Guangzhou Suburb
Rural Enterprise
United Corp
Guangzhou Suburb
Rural Enterprise
United Corp
Zhangjiang Tourism
Bureau .
Guangda United Enter-
prises Corp
Investment*
40
19.6
200
n.a.
Date Size, other details
1987 com- 38-story, 1,000-room hotel
pletion on 65,000-sq-m site
Dec. 1984
contract; 16-
year term
170-room hotel with shop-
ping arcade, restaurants
1988 com- 62-story hotel/office/
pletion apartment/exhibition com-
plex; 25-year free land use;
Bank of China guaranteed
70% of loan
16-story hotel on 9,400-
sq-m site
1987 com- n.a.
pletion; Aug.
1985 contract
40 1987 com-
pletion; Feb.
1985 contract
28-story, 900-room hotel
near new sports center in
Tianhe district
I ii
n.a.
I I
Wanjianglau
Hotel,
Guangzhou
Worldwide
Hotel,
Guangzhou
Wuyang New
Town Center,
Guangzhou
Haikou Hotel,
Hainan Island
Haitian Hotel,
Hainan Island
Qiongnan Ho-
tel, Hainan
Island
Mei Chung Co of Hong
Kong, and a US com-
pany
Shum Bo Development
Enterprises Co of Hong
Kong
Piu Luen Development
Co of Hong Kong
Cing Union Co of Hong
Kong
Pacific Corp, Marubeni
Corp, and Kajima Corp,
all of Japan
Sunaya Development of
Hong Kong
Guangzhou Jiahe
United Development
Corp
Guangzhou Dongshan
District Beverage
Services Corp
Guangzhou East China
Industrial Corp
Hainan Tourist Center
Haikou Foreign Eco-
nomic Development
Corp; Bank of China
Trust and Consultancy
Corp, Haikou branch
Bank of China, Hainan
branch; China Travel
Service, Hainan branch;
Hainan Sanya Salt Field
n.a. 1987 com- Three-star hotel on
pletion 55,000-sq-m site
18 1987 com-
pletion; July
1985 con-
tract; 20-
year term
n.a.
7.5 Sept. 1984
contract; 20-
year term
35 Nov. 1984
contract; 20-
year term
6.78 Aug. 1984
contract; 20-
year term
25-story, 360-room hotel
with 25,600 sq-m of floor
space
n.a.
n.a.
13-story, 525-room hotel;
work started in May 1985,
but suspended in Dec.
1985 due to late govern-
ment approval; completion
expected in 1988
n.a.
I i$ i iL I
ji I I i I
Project
GUANGDONG
Jinkui Inter-
national Hotel,
Jiangmen
Longhu Hotel,
Shantou
Shantou Inter-
national Hotel,
Shantou
Asia Hotel,
Shenzhen
Development
Center Man-
sion, Shenzhen
Huaqiao Hotel,
Shenzhen
Foreign investor/developer PRC investor/developer Investment* Date
Tai Kwong Development
Co of Hong Kong
Billion Source Investment
Co of Hong Kong
Lee Loi Investment
Agency Co of Hong
Kong
Hoi Tung Marine Ma-
chinery Equipment Co
of Hong Kong
Landtrade Co of Hong
Kong
C-Ho Co of Hong Kong
Yuezhong United De-
velopment Trading Corp
of Jiangmen
Shantou SEZ Com-
mission
Shantou International
Trust and Investment
SCorp
n.a.
25
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a. n.a.
China Travel Services,
Shenzhen branch
1988 com-
pletion; July
1985 con-
tract; 17-
year term
Late 1986
completion
n.a.
Under con-
struction
Under con-
struction
1987 com-
pletion; work
began June
1985; 15-
year term
Size, other details
30-story, 450-room hotel,
with roof-top rotary res-
taurant and pool; 45,000
sq-m of floor space
200-plus rooms
26-story, 400-room hotel;
to be managed by Lee
Gardens Hotel Manage-
ment Co of Hong Kong
605-room hotel
381-unit building
28-story, 637-room hotel
with 49,000 sq m of floor
space; US$39 million loan
from Barclays-led syndi-
cate in June 1985; to be
managed by Inter-Con-
tinental Hotels of the US
C Ii I
I II I i I
I i i I
Shenzhen In-
ternational
Hotel
n.a., Shenzhen
Palace Hotel,
Zhanjiang
GUIZHOU
Guizhou Hotel,
Guiyang
Jinzhu Hotel,
Guiyang
*US$ millions.
n.a.
Logistica
France
n.a.
Building Co of
Sun Luen (Holdings) Prop-
erty Development Co of
Macau
Guihai Co of Hong Kong
Christian Doris of the
US
Chunghua Trading Co of
Shenzhen SEZ
Guangdong Tourist
Bureau, Zhanjiang
branch
China Travel Services,
Guizhou branch
China Travel Service,
Guiyang branch; Bank
of China, Guiyang brand
n.a.
400
Under con-
struction
Jan. 1985
agreement in
principal
1987 com-
pletion; Aug.
1985 con-
tract; 18-
year term
10 Work began
Sept. 1985
Nov. 1984
contract; 20-
year term
426-room hotel
68-story, 3,200-room
hotel with 3,000-seat con-
ference room on 17,000-
sq-m site
Three-star hotel on
Haibin Road
397-room hotel with
30,800 sq m of floor
space
300-bed guest house
I I I I II  I I I
Project
GUANGXI
China (Guilin)
Hotel, Guilin
Guilin Man-
darin Hotel,
Guilin**
Guilin Overseas
Chinese Hotel,
Guilin
Panda Hotel,
Guilin
Ramada Renais-
sance Riverside
Hotel, Guilin
Foreign investor/developer
Nanyang Commercial
Banking Corp; Kwongtung
Province Bank, Hong Kong
branch; both of Hong
.Kong (hold 25% equity)
Tai Hing (Asia) Promotion
Co
Orient City of Hong Kong
Hopewell Holdings of
Hong Kong
China Trade Omni De-
velopment Center of
Hong Kong
PRC investor/developer
Bank of China, Nanning
branch; Guilin Tourism
Corp (together hold 75%
equity)
Guiqing Hotel Organizing
Office of Guilin
Guangzi Huajian Co
Guilin Tourism Corp
China Youth Travel
Service, Guangxi
branch -
Investment*
40
Date
Mid-1987
completion
of first phase;
20-year term
n.a.
May 1984
contract; 15-
year term
1986 com-
pletion
23 (first End-1988
phase) completion;
April 1987
complete
first phase
Size, other details
1,000-room hotel (600
rooms in first phase); to
be managed by New World
Hotels (International) Co
of Hong Kong
393-room hotel; US$20
million loan from Stand-
ard Chartered-led syndicate
300-bed guest house
2,500-room hotel
800-room hotel (354
rooms in first phase)
US$13 million loan in
Sept. 1986 from Hong
Kong branch of Neder-
landsche Middenstands-
bank NV, CTB Australia,
Bank of East Asia, Hok-
kaido Takushoku Bank
i; ii 1 I
I I I
I~ i
HUBEI
Shengli'Hotel,
Wuhan
JIANGSU
Nanjing Inter-
national Build-
ing, Nanjing
Nantong Hotel,
Nantong
Marubeni Corp of Japan
Fo Kei International Co
Wah Yan Holdings and
Wah Kong Holdings,
both of Hong Kong
Hanshan Temple Reliance Contractors Co
Hotel, Suzhou of Singapore
Suzhou Zhuhui
Hotel, Suzhou
Mitsubishi Electric
Engineering Co of Hong
Kong
Shengli Hotel, Wuhan n.a.
Jiangsu International
Trust and Investment
Corp; Nanjing Muni-
cipal Property Co
Nantong Foreign Tourism
Services Corp; Nantong
Dasheng Industrial Corp
Suzhou Economic and
Technical Development
Corp
China Overseas Con-
struction Engineering
Corp
n.a.
1989 com-
pletion; mid-
1985
contract
1987 com-
pletion; con-
struction
began in
Nov. 1985
End-1986
completion;
first phase
began Sept.
1985; 20-
year term
1988 com-
pletion;
Aug. 1985
contract
Renovation
Hotel/office/apartment
complex of 100,000 sq m
with exhibition, shop-
ping, and sports facilities
15-story, 300-room hotel
with 19,000 sq m of floor
space; US$11 million loan
from Bank of Communica-
tions, Hong Kong branch.
400-room hotel on a
22,000-sq-m site; to be
managed by Japanese firm;
Reliance has all profit in
first 10 years, 70% in next
six, and 40% in last four
400-room hotel
*US$ millIons.
"State Council halted project in April 1986 to cut two floors from eight-story design for esthetic reasons.
I I I
I - I I I I I I I
Project
LIAONING
n.a., Dandong
China Dalian
International
Hotel, Dalian
Dalian Furama
Hotel, Dalian
Qinggang Hotel,
Dalian
Foreign investor/developer
Toko Co of Japan
Javelin Transportation
and Construction Co
of Hong Kong
Farrives Co of Hong
Kong •
Huagang (China) Con-
struction Engineering
Co of Hong Kong
PRC investor/developer
Dandong Hotel
Investment* Date
5.04
Dalian Foreign Consul-
tative Service Co
Dalian Foreign Ship
Supply Co
Qingda Economic and
Trade Corp
23.5
12
Jiuzhou Hotel, A Hong Kong company Dalian Food and Bever-
Dalian age Corp
Oct. 1984
contract
Oct. 1984
contract;
18-year
term
Sept. 1984
contract;
18-year term
1986 com-
pletion;
work began
1985; 17-
year term
1989 com-
pletion;
work began
late 1986
Size, other details
630-room hotel
300-room hotel; US$17
million loan from a
Nanyang Commercial
Bank-led five-bank
consortium in 1986
300-room hotel
500-room hotel at Dalian
economic and techno-
logical development zone
336-room hotel; to be
managed by Holiday Inn;
US$20 million loan from a
Toyo Trust-led syndicate
in Sept. 1986
I I I It f
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Lien Lih (China Invest-
ment) of Hong Kong
Kunlun Hotel, Gori Pana Development
Xining of Hong Kong
SHAANXI
Erfanggong
Hotel, Xian
Tanghua Hotel,
Xian
Gudou Cultural
Art Center,
Xian
Datanggong
Hotel, Xian
Landtrade Co of
Hong Kong
Japanese companies
New World Hotel (Xian)
Co and Dako Co, both
of Hong Kong
Hong Bo Enterprise
Development Co of
Hong Kong
Qinghai Hotel
Qinghai Travel Service
Corp
n.a.
n.a.
China Huayue Interna-
tional Culture and Art
Exchange Corp
Northwest Electricity
Administration
Bureau
n.a.
n.a.
36
50;
(12 for
first
phase)
Jan. 1984
contract;
10-year
term
Mar. 1984
contract;
20-year
term
1987 com-
pletion
1987 com-
pletion;
work began
July 1986
1988 com-
pletion;
Nov. 1985
contract; 15-
year term
End-1 988
complete
first phase;
15-year
term
500-room hotel with
shopping arcade and
amusement park
300-bed guest house with
amusement park
650-room hotel
300-room hotel, with
1,900-sq-m exhibition hall
and 1,000-seat restaurant
480-room hotel, with
theater in 40,000 sq m;
to be managed by New
World Hotel (Interna-
tional) of Hong Kong
388-room hotel, theater,
and amusement park;
profit split equally between
partners during contract
period
QINGHAI
Qinghai Hotel,
Xining
f I I
I I I ;
Project
SHANDONG
Qingdao Over-
seas Chinese
Hotel, Qing-
dao
SICHUAN
Chongqing
Hotel
Yangtze Hotel,
Chongqing
Liyong Hotel,
Chengdu
XINJIANG
Worldwide
Hotel, Urumqi
YUNNAN
Kunming Over-
seas Chinese
Hotel, Kunming
Foreign investor/developer PRC investor/developer
Poly Enterprises Co,
Po Sang Bank, China and
South Sea Bank, Yien
Yieh Commercial Bank,
all of Hong Kong; Nan
Tung Bank of Macau
Soredic Co of Hong
Kong
Renful International and
Scriven Trading, both
of Hong Kong
Tai Heng Investment Co
of Hong Kong
Kai Wah Enterprises
of Hong Kong
Kam Wui Design
Engineering Co of
Hong Kong
Qingdao Overseas
Chinese Hotel
Chongqing Hotel
Chongqing Travel and
Tourism Corp
Sichuan Xinguang Trad-
ing Import-Export Corp
Urumqi Economic De-
velopment Corp
Yunnan International
Economic and Techno-
logical Cooperation Corp
Investment* Date
1984
contract;
15-year
term
Nov. 1984
contract
Dec. 1984
contract
Work began
Sept. 1985
Work began
Oct. 1985
June 1985
contract
n.a.
n.a.
Size, other details
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
10-story, 120-room
hotel; 50:50 equity
24-story, 400-room hotel
on 39,280-sq-m site
n.a.
P D I
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Cuihu Hotel,
Kunming
ZHEJIANG
China Hang-
zhou Huang-
long Hotel,
Hangzhou
Asia Garden
Hotel, Ningbo
Hangzhou
Hotel
Hangzhou Chi-
na-Japan Youyi
Hotel
Jinlong Hotel,
Ningbo
Kam Wui Design
Engineering Co of
Hong Kong
Kam Kui International
(Holdings) and Nanyang
Commercial Bank, both
of Hong Kong
Hoi Tung Marine Ma-
chinery Suppliers and
Wah Lee Trading Co,
both of Hong Kong
Shangri-La International
Hotels of Hong Kong
Showa Shoji Co of
Japan
Tai Ling Investment Co
of Hong Kong
*US$ millions.
Yunnan International
Economic and Techno-
logical Cooperation Corp
Hangzhou Tourist Co;
Hangzhou International
Consultants and Trust
Co; Bank of China
Ningbo Tourism and
Travel Corp
Zhejiang Tourist Co
Hangzhou Tourist Co
Bank of China Trust and
Consultancy Corp, Ning-
bo branch; Ningbo
Haishu District Tourism
Development Corp
n.a.
30
7.2
3
June 1985 Second-phase
contract . extension
Oct. 1984
contract;
13-year
term
Dec. 1984
contract;
15-year
term
July 1984
contract; 10-
year term
June 1984
contract; 13-
year term
Work began
Nov. 1985
7.5
578-room hotel; project
managed by Shui On;
hotel to be managed by
New World Group
(both of Hong Kong)
180-room hotel
450-room hotel
100-room hotel
24-story, 260-room hotel,
with 22,000 sq m of floor
space
EXHIBIT 9: SamDle Mail Survey
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Alfred P. Sloan School of Management
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
In reply write to:This correspondence is a part of
research work being
done for a Master's thesis
In order for me to document my information correctly could you please complete the following:
Name
Company
Position
1. Since what year has your firm had foreign representatives in China?.
2. How many foreign representatives does your company have doing business in China?
3. Where do they do business? (Give numberof representatives if possible)
Beijing
Guangzhou
Tianjin
Other(specify)
Shanghai
Xiamen
Shenzen
4. What is the typical length of a representatives stay in China?
Less than 1 week
1 -2 weeks
2 - 4 weeks (1 month)
1 - 6 months
Greater than 6 months
5. Where do your representatives in China live:
Hotels Other (Specify)
6. Is this because of:
Preference or Lack of alternatives
7. Does your company rent this space on a long-term or as needed basis?
8. How much living space do you rent? (estimate sq. meters or sq. feet)
9. What is the rental rate for this space?
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EXHIBIT 9: Sample Mail Survey (continued)
10. How would you rate these living conditions on: (Circle only one number for each attribute.)
Comfort
Cleanliness
Availability
Price
Focd
Recreational
availability
Accessibilty
to office
poor
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
avg.
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
excellent
7
7
,7
7
7
7
7
11. Does the living space double
(If Yes, then skip to 18)
as the office space?
12. What do your representatives use for an office:
Hotel room Other (Specify)
or Lack of alternatives
14. Does your company rent this space on a permanent
15. How much office space do you rent?
16. What is the rental rate for this space?
17. How do you rate these office conditions on: (Circle or
Suitability
Availabilty
Cost
Services:
Copying
Computer
Secretarial
Supplies
poor
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
or as needed basis?
nly
avg.
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
one number for each attribute.)
excellent
5 6 7
5 6 7
5 6 7
5 6 7
5 6 7
5 6 7
5 6 7
18. Do you believe there is a need for more adequate housing facilities for foreign nationals working In
China?
Yes
19. Do you believe that there is a need for more adequate office space and office services for foreign
nationals working in China?
Yes N o
101
Yes
13. Is this because of:
Preference
EXHIBIT 9: Sample Mail Survey (continued)
Assume that there was a complex which offered: 1) Modern office space with centralized services such
as copying, computing, and secretarial staff; 2) One and two bedroom residential units; 3) Amenities
such as recreational facilities, and western style restaurants and shops.
20. Would your company be interested in renting residential units in such a complex at your present
rental rate?
Yes ýb
21. Would your company be interested in renting office space in such a complex at your present rental
rate?
Yes Ib
22. Would you be willing to pay a premium over your current expenses to provide these type of
facilities to your representatives?
Yes No
23. In what city (ies) would you most like to see a complex, such as the one described above?
24. What features (services) would be most important to you?
25. What are your firms future plans concerning China?
Continue our operations as they currently exist.
Close or contract our current level of operations.
Expand our operations.
(Skip to 28)
26. How many representatives do you expect to be working in China after these changes?
27. In what cities do you plan to add or delete representation?
28. What time frame do you anticipate for these changes?
29. If you feel that any of your answers need further explanation ot if you have additional information
that you believe is appropriate, feel free to write on the back of these pages or to attach other
materials.
PLEASE RETURN SURVEYTO: Gerald R. Burns
Sloan School of Management
50 Memorial Drive
Room E52-112
Cambridge, MA 02138
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME
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